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The Inversion of Rights and Power
PHILIP HAMBURGER†
INTRODUCTION
No constitutional test is more important than the
compelling-government-interest test. It is the foundation of
all analysis of constitutional rights. But can a government
interest really defeat a constitutional right?
The courts repeatedly say that claims of constitutional
rights must give way to government interests. The courts
even sometimes say that a compelling government interest
justifies the infringement of a right—as when the Supreme
Court asks “whether some compelling state interest . . .
justifies the substantial infringement of appellant’s First
Amendment right.”1 In support of such doctrine, it often is
said that rights are “not absolute.”

† Maurice & Hilda Friedman Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. The author
is grateful for comments from Henry Monaghan, Jamal Greene and more
generally from the Columbia Faculty Workshop.
All quotations in this Article, other than those from the Constitution, are
rendered in conventional modern English—that is, they are reproduced with
modern spelling and capitalization, and without italicization, and abbreviations
are spelled out. The only exceptions are where the original English is retained for
emphasis.
1. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). Lest one think this was
inadvertent overstatement, the Court concluded that it was “highly doubtful”
whether the sort of evidence presented in that case “would be sufficient to warrant
a substantial infringement of religious liberties.” Id. at 407.

731

732

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

This sort of analysis of rights and government interests
raises a profoundly important question about the structural
relationship between rights and power. Which type of claim
is superior? And which is subordinate? Put another way, is
government power subject to rights, or are rights subject to
government power? The Supreme Court itself has begun to
ask such questions—as when the Court, in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission, recognized the possibility that
political speech may stand beyond any government
interests—the possibility that “political speech simply cannot
be banned or restricted as a categorical matter.”2 But the
Court left the question unanswered and thereby has
continued to leave even enumerated rights subject to power.
One might expect that rights would have the upper hand.
Much traditional Anglo-American political theory suggested
that rights prevailed over power, and American constitutions
enumerated rights to overcome the power granted to
2. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898, 919, 924, 925 (2010). Along
these lines, Eugene Volokh observes that “[t]here are restrictions the Court would
strike down . . . even though they are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.” Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and
Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2417 (1996). He further
argues that:
an approach that operates through categorical rules—such as a per se
ban on content-based speech restrictions imposed by the government as
sovereign—coupled with categorical exceptions, such as the exceptions
for fighting words, obscenity and copyright . . . would better direct the
Court’s analysis, and would avoid the erroneous results that strict
scrutiny seems to command.
Id. at 2418.
Indeed, in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 536, 543, 544, 547-49
(2001)—a spending case rather than case of sovereign commands—the Court
focused on whether the restriction violated the First Amendment without
bothering to consider whether the restriction was justified by compelling
government interests.
Of course, in suggesting that political speech may be unconditionally protected by
the First Amendment, the Court may have been speaking too colloquially. More
accurately, the Amendment bars Congress from making laws abridging the
freedom of speech, and this is a hint that the analysis should focus on the law
rather than simply on the speech. For example, the First Amendment appears to
bar laws that constrain speech on account of its being political, but it surely does
not thereby bar laws against, for example, treason or defamation, under which
political speech may be evidence of violations.
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government. Contemporary judicial doctrine, however,
reaches a different conclusion. It subjects enumerated rights
to compelling government interests and thereby inverts the
theoretical and constitutional relationship of such rights and
government power.
Elements of this argument are familiar. Ronald
Dworkin’s description of rights as “trumps” nicely captures
how rights ideally operate to defeat other claims—most
significantly, claims of power.3 Without relying on Dworkin’s
understanding of the matter (which has been disputed), and
without claiming that all rights are trumps, this Article
argues that enumerated constitutional rights should be
understood to trump power and that the contrary position
overturns their relationship to power.4
This view stands in contrast to current jurisprudence. As
put by Richard Pildes, rights are widely understood to be
merely the means of “channeling the kinds of reasons
government can invoke when it acts in certain arenas.”5
3. Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES
(Jeremy Waldron ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1995) (1984).

OF

RIGHTS 153, 153

4. What Dworkin meant in saying that rights are trumps has been disputed.
Compare Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights are Not Trumps: Social Meanings,
Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998), with
Jeremy Waldron, Pildes on Dworkin’s Theory of Rights, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 301,
305 (2000). But see Richard H. Pildes, Dworkin’s Two Conceptions of Rights, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 309, 311-12 (2000).
5. Pildes, Why Rights are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms,
and Constitutionalism, supra note 4, at 729.
According to Pildes, government can qualify rights “when the state acts on the
basis of justifications consistent with the character of the relevant common good
in question.” Id. at 761. It is unclear, however, exactly how claims of compelling
government interests can ever really be consistent with the claims of rights that
they defeat. Pildes’ point about justifications “consistent with the character of the
relevant common good in question,” appears to echo the test in United States v.
O’Brien under which a regulation of expressive conduct can be constitutional only
if it furthers an important government interest that is “unrelated to the
suppression of free expression.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968). This qualification is not part of the more typical doctrines applying
government interests, and it therefore would appear that Pildes is really offering
an idealized version of contemporary jurisprudence rather than an entirely
descriptive account.
Although Jeremy Waldron disagrees with Pildes’ understanding of Dworkin, he
observes that Pildes generally makes a good case that “[r]ights are ways to
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Thus, when government acts on acceptable reasons, it can
“infringe even the most fundamental rights.”6
When rights, however, are understood structurally, it
becomes apparent that enumerated rights are stronger than
claims of government power. Of course, many questions of
rights run into deeper waters, and the argument here does
not follow them far in that direction.7 But at least when rights
are considered in the structural arrangement of enumerated
rights and powers in the U.S. Constitution, the rights are
distinctively strong claims, and it thus becomes apparent
that the current judicial analysis of rights inverts their
relationship to power.
Rights often get left out of structural understandings of
constitutional law. Indeed, questions of rights are often
viewed as different from questions of structure. Yet if
enumerated rights are the means of elevating private
spheres of authority above the authority of government, then
they are as much a part of the structural arrangement of
power as any other part of constitutional law, and the
inversion thus has structural significance for the limitations
on government.8
The inversion is sobering, for although it may be
tempting to dismiss it as a merely theoretical problem, it cuts
into the everyday freedom of Americans. When rights trump
powers, they sharply limit government, notwithstanding its
powers. When powers can trump rights, however, the rights
channel the kinds of reasons and justifications government can act on in different
domains.” Waldron, supra note 4, at 305.
6. Pildes, Why Rights are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms,
and Constitutionalism, supra note 4, at 729; see also Pildes, Dworkin’s Two
Conceptions of Rights, supra note 4, at 311-12 (government can “infringe
individual interests on the basis of certain reasons but permit infringement on
other grounds”).
7. The jurisprudential literature is of limited relevance for this Article—in
part because of the jurisprudential tendency to generalize about rights as a whole.
In contrast, for purposes of understanding traditional constitutional structure,
enumerated and unenumerated constitutional rights are very different, and both
are different from non-constitutional rights.
8. For a recent recognition of the structural role of rights, see Barry Cushman,
Carolene Products and Constitutional Structure, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 321, 322-24,
334 (2013) (regarding due process limits on the power over interstate commerce).
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become vulnerable to claims of superior power, and this has
consequences both in court and out of court—as will become
apparent from cases on national security, religious liberty,
jury rights, and freedom of speech.9
Caveats & Objections. —Of course, the argument here
comes with caveats and objections. Rather than defeat the
argument, however, these qualifications reveal its limits.
The caveats will become obvious but are worth stating
expressly. For one thing, the argument here concerns only
enumerated constitutional rights and their relationship to
government power. In other words, its logic does not apply to
unenumerated constitutional rights (as will be explored in
Part I.C.).
Second, although it is possible that at least some nonconstitutional rights and powers are absolute in relation to
other non-constitutional rights and powers, such ideas are
not pursued here.10 The non-constitutional questions are
interesting, but the complexities would distract from this
Article’s relatively simple constitutional point.
Third, even as to the constitutional question, this Article
rests on a pair of empirical inquiries. It examines the
changed relationship of constitutional rights and powers, and
the consequences of inverting this structure. These empirical
questions are the foundation of the argument, and this
Article therefore has no need to dig into deeper
jurisprudential questions about rights.
In this connection, it is worth emphasizing that this
Article looks back to history to measure the subsequent loss
in rights, not to assert the authority of the past. The Article
therefore makes no claim about the optimal method for
9. The argument here is loosely aligned with Vincent Blasi’s suggestion that
speech rights should be formulated from a “pathological perspective”—meaning
that they should be formulated for “the worst of times.” Vincent Blasi, The
Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 44951 (1985). For the alignment and some differences, see infra Part VI, especially
section D.
10. For a discussion of such issues, see Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism
and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999) (questioning “rights
essentialism” as to private rights).
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interpreting the Bill of Rights, nor even about the optimal
extent of any particular right. Instead, the goal is, more
generally, to observe changes in the protection for rights, for
by this means one can see the danger of doctrines that invert
rights and power.11 Such are the caveats.
Some predictable objections further illuminate the
limited character of the argument here; rather than identify
real obstacles, these objections refine the argument’s focus.
For example, it inevitably will be objected that rights cannot
be understood without reference to government interests or
powers. Certainly, when lawmakers establish rights, they
need to take government interests or powers into account,
but this does not mean that they need to define rights in
terms of such interests or powers.
Similarly, it may be objected that, metaphysically, rights
are not absolutes. But this Article’s argument has little to do
with the ultimate nature or character of rights; instead, it
merely examines the structural relationship of enumerated
rights to powers in American constitutions, particularly the
U.S. Constitution. On this foundation, it will become
apparent that if such rights are to have adequate bite—if
they are to protect liberty when it is under profound stress
from a majority or other dominant opinion—then they must
be structurally absolute in the sense that they are not
qualified by government interests or expressions of power.12
11. For example, the Second Amendment right to bear arms can be interpreted
in many ways, and can be understood either broadly or narrowly, but rather than
address such questions, this Article merely suggests that, like other enumerated
rights, it should be understood in a way that does not subject it to government
power.
12. Of course, there are yet other possible objections. For example, it may be
thought that the inversion affects only the periphery of rights, not their core. It
will be seen, however, that the inversion actually cuts into central claims of
rights. See infra Parts II and VI
Another objection may be that the argument here is merely terminological. Yet
the framing of rights has consequences. Although there always is a danger that
government will violate rights, some ways of framing of rights have the effect of
legitimizing violations.
A further concern may be that this Article elevates form over function. Forms of
law, however, including the forms of rights, can have functional advantages, thus
uniting form and function. This point will be pursued later, see infra Part III, but
already here it can be noted that, just as there is much value to rule
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Summary. —In many other societies (from imperial
Rome to modern Europe) power has traditionally been
superior to rights. Even in the United States, where at least
some rights are enumerated, power has at times prevailed
over them, for the claims of government are often in tension
with liberty and cannot always be stayed.13 But it has been
left for twentieth and twenty-first century judges to elevate
power over rights, even enumerated rights, as an American
constitutional ideal. The result is that whereas enumerated
rights once were superior to government power, they now are
subordinate to the very power they were designed to confine.
This Article begins (I) by observing the structural
relation between rights and power in the U.S. Constitution—
showing how, in contrast to Continental ideas of absolute
power, the U.S. Constitution traditionally enumerated
constitutional rights as absolute exceptions to government
power. The Article then (II) shows how judicial doctrine has
inverted rights and powers—the primary example being the
compelling-government-interest test. The Article rounds out
its argument by examining (III) the place of interests and
other functional analysis in understanding rights and (IV)
the structurally absolute character of enumerated
utilitarianism, so there is much value to what might be called rights
utilitarianism.
Yet another possible question is whether the choice between absolutely protecting
rights, and allowing power to trump them, is merely another instance of the
choice between rules and standards. The rules-standards debate, however,
addresses a much broader problem. For example, it mostly concerns nonconstitutional rights and often merely a conflict over rights between private
parties, and thus, where the rights are treated as mere standards, the balancing
often elevates merely the interest of one private party over another. In contrast,
the problem here exclusively concerns constitutional rights, and the balancing or
trumping is done not for a range of parties, private and public, but for the
government. The problem here is therefore both narrower and more serious than
the average rules-standards problem. Accordingly, when the inversion problem is
swept under the rules-standards rug, a profound constitutional danger is masked
under the familiar and reassuring terminology of a more mundane question.
13. Traditionally, when executive officers thought it necessary for them briefly
to exceed the law for the sake of the nation, they were expected to throw
themselves on the mercy of the people, or their legislature, which could indemnify
the officers or leave them to their fate in the courts, as it saw fit. In this way, they
could depart from law as necessary, without legitimizing unlawful power. For a
contemporary approach to the question, see generally Henry P. Monaghan, The
Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1993).
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constitutional rights and how, as a result of the inversion,
their character has changed. Finally (V & VI), the Article
examines the inversion’s alleged benefits and its sobering
practical costs.
Topping off this argument, the Appendix shows that
when Americans introduced the inversion, they drew upon
Continental absolutist ideas. It thus is not a coincidence that
constitutional rights have been subjected to power.
I. STRUCTURAL RELATION OF RIGHTS AND POWER
Enumerated rights limit power. Giving effect to this
structural relationship, American constitutions not only
allocate powers and rights but also arrange these spheres of
authority in relation to each other so that enumerated rights
carve out exceptions from government power. Put another
way, government power is subject to constitutionally
enumerated rights.
A. Two Traditions of Rights
Roughly speaking, two predominant legal traditions
have evolved in the past millennium—an absolutist
Continental tradition and a constitutionalist AngloAmerican tradition.14 Although they could be viewed as
merely historical, their contrasting paths remain important,

14. Of course, this generalization is subject to a host of obvious qualifications.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to think of a legal tradition that has been as dominant
in the last thousand years as either the common law or the civil law.
More narrowly, one might question whether the civilian tradition should be
characterized as absolutist. Certainly, there were repeated efforts by many
civilian scholars to limit the worst elements of the absolutism, as evident from at
least the time of Accursius onward. See infra note 23. Even when thus moderated,
however, civilian scholarship typically leant toward accepting one degree or
another of absolute power.
In the wake of World War II, much scholarship on Continental law has
emphasized the civilian theories that limited absolutism. It is understandable
that scholars working in Continental law have sought to find in its traditions at
least some foundation for limits on state power. It would be a mistake, however,
to ignore the profound differences between the common law and civil law
approaches to power.
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for they suggest just how much is at stake in the relation of
rights to power.
The Tradition of Absolute Power. —Beginning in the
Middle Ages, European scholars developed ideas about
absolute power. Although multiple types of power could be
associated with absolutism, absolutism generally attributed
to rulers (whether monarchs or, eventually, the State) a
power that, at least in some instances, rose above the law and
the rights claimed under it.15 This structural understanding
that government power could trump rights, even
constitutional rights, is the sort of absolute power that
matters here.
Although advocates of absolute power included some
common lawyers, it arose mainly in the learned law—the
academic study of the civil and canon law and their
foundations in Roman models.16 In this tradition, some
scholars elevated the sovereign power of the monarch or the
State so high as to place it above law and legal rights, and
although there is no need here to explore all features of this
absolute power, some elements of it require attention because
they remain so suggestive about the contemporary elevation
of power over rights.
One sort of power associated with absolutism was the
power to bind subjects, not merely through and under the law
adopted by the community or its representatives, but also
beyond the law and above it. In civilian systems, it seemed
an inherent characteristic of sovereignty that a ruler could
impose his will through mere commands or orders and thus
outside the regular mechanisms of lawmaking. This was not
to say he should rule in such a manner, but simply that he
could. And at least when he exercised power extralegally—
through commands rather than legislative acts—he seemed
15. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 25-26 (2014).
16. See Francis Oakley, Jacobean Political Theology: The Absolute and
Ordinary Powers of the King, 29 J. HIST. IDEAS, 323, 331-32 (1968). For some
theological beginnings, see WILLIAM J. COURTENAY, CAPACITY AND VOLITION: A
HISTORY OF THE DISTINCTION OF ABSOLUTE AND ORDAINED POWER 87 (1990)
(regarding philosophic development of ideas about God’s potential to ordain law
differently than he did).

740

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

free to act regardless of any law to the contrary. His
extralegal power thus was also largely supralegal. This
understanding of sovereign power has emboldened rulers
from the Middle Ages to the present—from kings to
bureaucratic states—to claim a power that defeats rights,
even legally protected rights.17
Elevating this point of view to political theory, Jean
Bodin defined the sovereign as one who enjoyed a power
outside and above the law—a power that therefore could not
be challenged on grounds of rights. It was “an absolute power,
not subject to any law” and thus a power to “dispose of the
goods and lives, and of all the state at his pleasure.”18 More
recently and crudely, the Nazi apologist Carl Schmitt
celebrated sovereignty as the power to institute emergency
power, proclaiming: “Sovereign is he who decides on the
exception.”19 This sort of power was an exception to law and
the rights claimed under it.
A second aspect of absolutism was to view government as
the ultimate source of authority in society and thus as the
final judge of what was best for the people. In the Middle
Ages and later, some civilian-influenced commentators
attributed such authority to rulers, but from the sixteenth
century onward, they increasingly attributed it, instead, to
the State.20 From this perspective, regardless of whether the
17. For example, Thomas Cromwell encouraged Henry VIII to believe that “his
will and pleasure” should be “regarded for a law” because this was what it “was
to be a very king.” Letter from Stephen Gardiner to Protector Somerset (Oct. 14,
1547), in THE LETTERS OF STEPHEN GARDINER 379, 399 (James Arthur Miller ed.,
1933) (recounting conversation with Cromwell and the king).
18. JEAN BODIN, THE SIX BOOKES OF A COMMONWEALE 73, 84, 88, 92, (Kenneth
Douglas McRae ed., Richard Knolles trans., facsimile reprint 1962) (1606). Such
a ruler could deign to act through his ordinary laws, but he could not thereby limit
himself if he was to remain sovereign or absolute. Of course, as Kenneth
Pennington emphasizes, even this was not a freedom from “the laws of God and
nature,” for “all princes and people of the world are unto them subject,” even if
only “before the tribunal seat of almighty God.” Id. at 92, 104; KENNETH
PENNINGTON, THE PRINCE AND THE LAW 276-283 (1993).
19. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY 5-7 (George Schwab trans., Univ. Chi.
Press 2005) (1922).
20. See, e.g., BODIN, supra note 18, at 168 (arguing that the right of hearing
“the [l]ast [a]ppeal” was a mark of sovereignty).
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State acted through law or outside it, the State had a power
to act in interests of the society, even if at the cost of law and
legal rights.
This supreme State authority was sometimes explained
in terms of a third element of absolutism, the doctrine of state
necessity. Necessity, it was said, had no law—necessitas non
habet legem. From this perspective, necessity defeated rights,
regardless of whether the State acted through law or through
mere executive commands.21 In contemporary terms, when
government had necessitous or compelling interests, its
interests rose above claims of rights.
Of course, many civilian commentators worried about the
extent of power such ideas could justify, and some attempted
to moderate the worst dangers—for example, by developing
doctrine on causa. A standard example of the unjust exercise
of power was a ruler’s decision to take property from one of
his subjects and give it to another. Rather than celebrate this
extraordinary power, commentators tended to regret it. They
did not deny that a ruler could do such a thing, but they
sought to discourage it, and they therefore argued that a
ruler could not transfer property in this way without causa—
that is, without a cause or reason.22 Although the words have
changed, this amounted to a requirement that the ruler had
to have a compelling interest.
In such ways, the absolutist tradition hints at the
genealogy and danger of ideas about overriding state
interests. Exactly how this tradition and its doctrines about
compelling state interests entered American law must be
relegated to the Appendix, but already here the absolutist
heritage is enough to make one worry.

21. ALBERICI DE ROSATE, DICTIONARIUM IURIS: TAM CIVILIS, QUAM CONONICI
(Facsimile reprint 2009) (1581); see also WALTER ULLMANN, THE MEDIEVAL IDEA
OF LAW AS REPRESENTED BY LUCAS DE PENNA 95 (Barnes & Noble, Inc. 1969)
(1946).
22. See ULLMANN, supra note 21, at 100-03. For another discussion of this just
cause requirement, and how little it really constrained rulers, see R. W. CARLYLE
& A. J. CARLYLE, 6 A HISTORY OF MEDÆVAL POLITICAL THEORY IN THE WEST 453
(Barnes & Noble, Inc. 1962) (1936) (paraphrasing Gentili on the power of the
prince to take his subjects’ property).
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The Constitutional Tradition. —In contrast to the
absolutism tradition was the constitutional tradition that
flourished in common law countries. Aspects of this approach
developed on the Continent, but it was pursued most
consistently in the United States.
What elevated law, and thus constitutional rights, above
sovereign power was the underlying power of the people to
make law. The thirteenth century English judge Bracton
already hinted that the law established the ruler and that a
law made by the people might bind the ruler.23 By the
fifteenth century, some Englishmen were disputing whether
the “ordinances of men, by which some of them are raised into
kings” really “deserve to be called constitutions”—this being
a variant of the old Roman name for an enacted law.24 And at
least by the seventeenth century, it was commonplace to
23. Bracton recited the familiar notion that the king was to “temper his power
by law, which is the bridle of power, that he may live according to the laws,” and
then suggestively added: “for the law of mankind has decreed that his own laws
bind the lawgiver.” 2 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 305
(George E. Woodbine ed., Samuel E. Thorne trans., 1968) (1922) [hereinafter
BRACTON]. Brian Tierney suggests that Accursius took such a view and, indeed,
that he was the source of Bracton’s ideas. Brian Tierney, “The Prince is not Bound
by the Laws.” Accursius and the Origins of the Modern State, 5 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y
& HIST. 378, 400 (1963). Although Accursius sought to confine the danger from
absolutist Roman texts, he did not go nearly as far as Bracton. As Tierney himself
notes, Accursius merely argued that the prince, by his own will, subjects himself
to the law. Id. at 390. Even when Accursius engaged in “a sort of rhapsody on the
rule of law,” id. at 394, he still was merely arguing that the prince should choose
to submit to the laws—laws that Accursius identified as “promulgated by the
divine will.” Id. at 393. In contrast, it should be recalled, Bracton speaks of the
law as the “bridle of power,” and says that “the law of mankind has decreed that
his own laws bind the lawgiver.” BRACTON, supra, at 305. Bracton understood the
possibility that human law could limit other human law, and he thereby went
much further than the learned lawyers on the Continent who had to remain
within their absolutist Roman framework, and who therefore could, at best,
attempt to moderate it.
The failure of the learned lawyers to break out of the absolutist mold is recognized
by Kenneth Pennington. As he puts it, the jurists, in “a slightly paradoxical
argument,” argued that “the prince should conform to the provisions of the law,
although he himself was not bound by it.” PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 59.
24. John Fortescue, De Natura Legis Naturæ, in 1 THE WORKS OF SIR JOHN
FORTESCUE 73, 200 (Thomas Fortescue ed., facsimile reprint 1978) (1869)
(constitutiones merenter dici).
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speak about how the people adopted the “constitution” of
their government.25
The conceptual point was that constitutional law,
including constitutional rights, trumped any government
power. If all sovereign or government power came from the
people—in particular, if it came from the people’s enactment
or constitution establishing the government—then sovereign
power was subject to that law and any rights it secured. As
put by the sixteenth century Scottish theorist George
Buchanan, the “voice of the people” had the effect of
“circumscrib[ing]” the society and thereby also the ruler
within “the hedge of laws.”26
Seeking to avoid any such constraint, Buchanan’s most
famous student, James VI of Scotland—soon to be James I of
England—argued that his power came not from the people,
but from God, and that, therefore, James himself had created
the Scottish constitution.27
Those who distrusted kings, however, had the advantage
of arguing from the power of the community or people. In the
1640s, for example, the Parliamentary pamphleteer Henry
Parker asserted: “[p]rinces were created by the people, for the
25. PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 84-90 (2008).
26. GEORGE BUCHANAN, DE JURE REGNI APUD SCOTOS 71, 113 (Philalethes
trans., n.p. 1680). Buchanan was not alone. According to Vindiciæ Contra
Tyrannos, “the king receives the laws from the people,” and “if the laws be
superior to the king,” and if “the king be tied in the same respect of obedience to
the laws, as the servant is to his master[,] who will be so senseless, that will not
rather obey the law, then the king?” Thus, “the king is not lord over the laws.”
JUNIUS BRUTUS, VINDICIÆ CONTRA TYRANNOS 63, 66 [sic] (sigs. K2[r], K[3v])
(London 1648). Francois Hotman noted that “the kings of France have not been
granted unmeasured and unlimited power by their countrymen and cannot be
considered absolute,” for “they are bound by definite laws and compacts”—the
laws being “leges regias,” which came from the people. Francois Hotman,
Francogallia, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RESISTANCE IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY:
THREE TREATISES BY HOTMAN, BEZA, & MORNAY, app. at 90, 92 (Julian H. Franklin
ed. & trans., 1969). This was from Chapter XXV, which Hotman added in the
third, 1586 edition to emphasize that the French king “does not have unlimited
dominion in his kingdom but is circumscribed by settled and specific law.” Id. at
90.
27. King James VI and I, The Trew Law of Free Monarchies, reprinted in THE
POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES I 53, 61-62 (Charles Howard McIlwain ed., 1918)
(1598).
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peoples sake, and so limited by express laws as that they
might not violate the peoples liberty.”28 Of course, the same
argument could be made against Parliament when it claimed
absolute power, and the royalist judge David Jenkins
therefore hammered away at the legislature in the 1640s,
declaring that “the safety and security of the English people,
their lives, their liberties, and peculiar proprieties, are as it
were entrusted to the guardianship, and deposited in the
keeping and defense of laws and constitutions of their own
framing.”29 If power came from the people, and if the people
empowered their rulers through their constitution, then
there could not be any lawful power that was not subject to
the constitution and constitutional rights.
The English settled that power was subject to rights in
the Revolution of 1688. King James II sought in various ways
to assert absolute power over legal rights, and partly for this
reason, the English chased him out the country and
established William III and Mary as king and queen. In so
doing, the English used their Declaration of Rights to make
clear that royal power was subject to rights. The Declaration
recited James’ violations of law as the ground for his
departure from the throne, and it then vindicated the
violated rights by declaring them and making William’s
commitment to “preserve” them the basis for crowning
William and Mary.30 This couple sat as sovereigns, but their
power was subject to the rights of the people.
Constitutional Limits on Legislative Power. —Although
the Crown in the seventeenth century was subjected to the
constitution and constitutional
rights,
Parliament
increasingly claimed a sovereign power above law.
Predictably, it used this power in a high-handed way, and
28. HENRY PARKER, JUS POPULI 2 (London, 1644).
29. DAVID JENKINS, THE KING’S PREROGATIVE AND THE SUBJECT’S PRIVILEDGES
ASSERTED 49 (London, 1684). Jenkins understood that the English had layers of
constitutional documents and traditions, and therefore tended to speak of
multiple “constitutions.” HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY, supra note 25, at
88 n.44.
30. An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the
Succession of the Crown (Declaration of Rights), 1689, 1 W. & M., sess. 2, c.2
(Eng.).
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after Americans suffered under Parliament, they
subordinated even legislative power to their constitutions
and constitutional rights.
In the 1640s, when Parliament began to defeat royal
absolutism, its supporters claimed that it now enjoyed
absolute power—even an absolute power over rights. William
Prynne, for example, urged that Parliament could imprison
men without regard to Magna Carta or habeas corpus,
explaining that it had “an absolute sovereignty over the laws
themselves”—“yea, over Magna Carta.”31 Although in the
next century, Blackstone avoided such dramatic statements,
he concluded that Parliament enjoyed a constitutional power
above law—the legislature being “the place where . . .
absolute despotic power . . . is entrusted by the constitution
of these kingdoms.”32 To be sure, this was a power exercised
through statutes, but it was absolute in being unlimited by
law, and it thus was a power over all rights.
Parliament thereby came to exercise power over the
rights that Americans expected to hold as Englishmen.
Consequently, when Americans, in their Declaration of
Independence, recited George III’s acts of oppression, they
included some that were really Parliamentary violations of
their rights. The Americans complained, for example, of his
“quartering large bodies of armed troops among us,” of his
“imposing taxes on us without our consent,” and of his
“depriving us, in many cases, of the benefits of trial by jury.”33
These were among the “[o]ppressions” that Parliament had
authorized on the foundation of its absolute power.34
In reaction to their experience with Parliament,
Americans generally aimed to establish constitutions that
limited all parts of their government, including their
31. WILLIAM PRYNNE, THE SOVERAIGNE POWER OF PARLIAMENTS AND
KINGDOMES: DIVIDED INTO FOURE PARTS, First Part, 46, 93, 103, Fourth Part, 15
(London, 1643).
32. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *156.
33. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 16, 19, 20 (U.S. 1776).
34. Id. at para. 30; see Quartering Act, 1765, 5 Geo. 3, c. 33 (Eng.); see also
Amendment to Quartering Act, 1774, 14 Geo. 3, c. 54 (Eng.); Stamp Act, 1765, 5
Geo. 3, c. 12 (Eng.).

746

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

legislatures, and they thereby ensured that all government
power would be subject to constitutional rights. Writing in
1786 about the people of North Carolina during the
Revolution, James Iredell explained that they “were not
ignorant of the theory, of the necessity of the legislature
being absolute in all cases, because it was the great ground
of the British pretensions,” and on their “own severe
experience” with this theory, the people of the state
“decisively gave our sentiments against it.”35 They had
adopted their constitution as “the fundamental basis of our
government” so as “to impose restrictions on the legislature
that might still leave it free to all useful purposes, but at the
same time guard against the abuses of unlimited power.”36
Accordingly, there was “no doubt, but that the power of the
assembly is limited and defined by the Constitution”—and
this meant primarily its enumeration of rights.37 As the

35. James Iredell, To the Public (Aug. 1786), reprinted in 3 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES IREDELL 227, 227-28 (Donna Kelly & Lang Baradell eds., 2003) (emphasis
omitted).
36. Id. at 227.
37. Id. at 228. For example, when the North Carolina Superior Court, in 1787
in Bayard v. Singleton, held a North Carolina statute unconstitutional, it
explained that “by the [state’s] constitution every citizen had undoubtedly a right
to a decision of his property by a trial by a jury.” 1 N.C. 42, 45 (1787); see also
Newbern, June 7, VA. INDEP. CHRON., July 4, 1787. It added that if “the legislature
could take away this right,” it could do anything else prohibited by the
Constitution: “[I]t might with as much authority require his life to be taken away
without a trial by jury, and that he should stand condemned to die, without the
formality of any trial at all.” Bayard, 1 N.C. at 45; see also Newbern, June 7, supra.
For details, see HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY, supra note 25, at 449-61.
A decade earlier, the same court held that a judicial act violated a constitutionally
guaranteed right. After a 1777 North Carolina Statute authorized county courts
to detain and sell manumitted blacks, the Perquimans County Court held and
sold a substantial number of men, women, and children who had been freed prior
to the enactment of the statute. On certiorari, the Superior Court therefore held
the County Court’s proceedings “[n]ull and [v]oid” on the ground that:
the said County Court, in . . . their proceedings, have exceeded their
jurisdiction, violated the rights of the subjects, and acted in direct
opposition to the Bill of Rights of this state considered justly as part of
the Constitution thereof, by giving a law not intended to affect this case
a retrospective operation thereby to deprive free men of this state of their
liberty contrary to the law of the land.
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North Carolina lawyer Archibald Maclaine observed about
his state’s legislature, “[t]he assembly is the sovereign of this
country[,] having all the powers of the people delegated to
them under certain restrictions.”38 Rights trumped power.
B. Enumerated Rights in American Constitutions
Both in the state constitutions and the federal
Constitution, Americans carved out rights as exceptions from
powers. They gave power—legislative, executive, and
judicial—to their governments and then guaranteed rights
that restricted or withdrew portions of this power.39 Power
thus was subject to enumerated rights rather than the other
way round.
The U.S. Constitution revealed the relation of rights and
powers already in its allocation of powers to the three
branches of government. In section 8, Article I granted
enumerated powers to Congress, and immediately afterward,
in section 9, it carved out various rights, such as that against
a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law. These were
exceptions to the powers, and ordinarily that was the end of
the matter.
The Constitution, of course, could also specify a
subsequent government interest or power, which defeated a
right—as when the Constitution stated: “The privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when
in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it.”40 The Constitution thus identified where a
State v. Clerk of Perquimans County (N.C. Superior. Ct., 1778), as quoted in
HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY, supra note 25, at 389.
38. Archibald Maclaine, Memorandum (c.1786), as quoted in HAMBURGER, LAW
supra note 25, at 470-71.

AND JUDICIAL DUTY,

39. Of course, some states, Connecticut and Rhode Island, did not follow this
pattern because they did not adopt express constitutions. HAMBURGER, LAW AND
JUDICIAL DUTY, supra note 25, at 436.
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. Another example was the provision that “[t]he
Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall
think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year
one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such
Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.” Id. It is disturbing to
think of this provision as a right, and certainly it threatened other rights, but it
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government interest justified an exception from an
enumerated right. But otherwise the enumerated rights were
exceptions from power.
When Anti-Federalists demanded a bill of rights, they
relied on the general assumption that a right was a secure
exception, which always defeated power. They feared that the
Constitution’s enumeration of powers would not adequately
limit the new government, and they therefore demanded an
enumeration of rights, for only by this means, they thought,
could power be constrained. As one of them explained,
“wherever the powers of a government extend to the lives, the
persons, and properties of the subject, all their rights ought
to be clearly and expressly defined—otherwise, they have but
a poor security for their liberties.”41
nicely illustrates how a wide range of limitations on the federal government could
function as rights.
41. A Democratic Federalist, PA. HERALD, Oct. 17, 1787, reprinted in 13(1) THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 386, 388 (John
P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981).
Anti-Federalist complaints of this sort were numerous. For example, the Federal
Farmer argued: “[t]here are certain . . . rights, which in forming the social
compact, ought to be explicitly ascertained and fixed—a free and enlightened
people . . . will not resign all their rights to those who govern, and they will fix
limits to their legislators and rulers.” Federal Farmer Letters to the Republican
(Letter II) (Oct. 9, 1787), in Observations Leading to a Fair Examination of the
System of Government Proposed by the Late Convention; and to Several Essential
and Necessary Alterations in It (1787), reprinted in 14(2) THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 43, at 25, 27.
Elbridge Gerry complained that “the system is without the security of a bill of
rights.” Letter from Elbridge Gerry to the Massachusetts General Court (Oct. 18,
1787), in 13(1) THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION, supra, at 548. Another Anti-Federalist wrote:
There is no provision by a bill of rights to guard against the dangerous
encroachments of power in too many instances to be named. . . . The
rights of individuals ought to be the primary object of all government,
and cannot be too securely guarded by the most explicit declarations in
their favor.
MERCY WARREN, A COLUMBIAN PATRIOT: OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION
(1788), reprinted in 16(4) THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION, supra, 272, 281-82.
Later, Jefferson observed: “What I disapproved from the first moment . . . was the
want of a bill of rights to guard liberty against the legislative as well as executive
branches of the government.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Francis Hopkinson
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Although Federalists at least initially disagreed about
the necessity of a bill of rights, they similarly understood
rights to be exceptions to powers. Alexander Hamilton, in his
defense of the U.S. Constitution, explained that “[b]y a
limited constitution I understand one which contains certain
specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for
instance as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post
facto laws, and the like.”42 Similarly, when James Madison
overcame his objections to a bill of rights, he introduced the
initial draft of the Bill of Rights on the floor of the House of
Representatives with the observation that “a bill of rights”
would “enumerat[e] particular exceptions to the grant of
power.”43
C. Unenumerated Rights
Although the main point here is that enumerated rights
were exceptions to powers, it should be recognized that the
other rights retained by the people were not. Some
contemporary commentators assume that the unenumerated
rights protected by the Ninth Amendment had the same
relationship to federal power as enumerated rights. The
unenumerated rights, however, were understood to be the
rights or liberty left over, after the grant of federal powers
and the subtraction of enumerated rights.44 Such rights thus
were defined, in the first instance, by federal powers.
(Mar. 13, 1789), in 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 649, 650 (Julian P. Boyd
ed., 1958). He worried about “the important rights, not placed in security by the
frame of the constitution itself.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to David
Humphries (Mar. 18, 1789), in 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at
676, 678.
42. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 524 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
43. Speech of James Madison (June 8, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 77, 83 (Helen E.
Veit et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS].
44. See Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1980);
Philip A. Hamburger, Trivial Rights, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 3 (1994); Richard
S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three
Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 271 (1988); Thomas B. McAffee,
The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1215, 1219-23
(1990); William Van Alstyne, Slouching Toward Bethlehem with the Ninth
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This traditional vision of unenumerated rights may come
as a surprise, for many scholars reify unenumerated rights
and expect them to serve as additions to the enumerated
rights. Historically, however, unenumerated rights were
merely aspects of the undifferentiated freedom that was left
to the people after their grant of power to federal
government. This perspective is well documented, and it is
important here because it illustrates the distinctive
trumping character of the enumerated rights.45
When Anti-Federalists protested that the Constitution
could not safely be ratified without a bill of rights, Federalists
responded that a bill of rights was unnecessary. The
Constitution’s enumeration of powers would leave all
unenumerated matters beyond the reach of the federal
government, and in this sense the enumeration of federal
powers defined a broad extent of undifferentiated liberty or
unenumerated rights. On this basis, Federalists felt
confident that the Constitution as proposed would protect
freedom. Thus, even without a bill of rights, it was safe to
ratify the document.
Indeed, some Federalists added that it would be
dangerous to add a bill of rights. Although an enumeration of
rights would secure what was listed, it might be taken to
imply that whatever was not enumerated as a right was not
constitutionally protected. In other words, an enumeration of
rights would be understood to “disparage those rights which
were not placed in that enumeration, and it might follow by
implication, that those rights which were not singled out,
were intended to be assigned into the hands of the general
government.”46 Thus, the enumeration of rights would
undermine the effect of the enumeration of powers in
protecting the people’s unenumerated liberty or rights.
Madison was among those who made this argument, and
therefore, when he eventually was persuaded (primarily for
political reasons) to propose the Bill of Rights, he had to
Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 207, 207, 209 (1981) (reviewing CHARLES BLACK,
DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW (1981)).
45. For the documentation, see sources cited supra note 44.
46. Speech of James Madison (June 8, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 43, at 83.

2015]

INVERSION OF RIGHTS AND POWER

751

admit that this was “one of the most plausible arguments I
have ever heard urged against the admission of a bill of rights
into this system.”47
To avoid the danger that he and his fellow Federalists
had emphasized, he included in his proposed bill of rights
what would become the Ninth Amendment. He designed the
amendment to avoid any misconstruction of the Bill of
Rights—to clarify that the enumerated rights were merely
exceptions from the enumerated powers, not suggestions
about further powers, which would reach any unenumerated
rights. On this foundation, the amendment as finally adopted
guaranteed that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution of
certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.”48
It was in support of this position that Madison
emphasized that “a bill of rights” would “enumerat[e]
particular exceptions to the grant of power.”49 Being merely
exceptions to federal power, the enumerated rights did not
47. Id.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
49. Speech of James Madison, in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 43,
at 83. This conception of enumerated rights was familiar because of the
controversy as to whether a Bill of Rights would be taken to imply unenumerated
powers—as to whether a list of rights would seem to suggest the government had
power over all matters not specifically mentioned as rights. Id. To preserve the
character of the Bill of Rights and other enumerated rights as a series of
exceptions from the powers granted, the Virginia ratifying convention proposed:
That those clauses which declare that Congress shall not exercise certain
powers be not interpreted in any manner whatsoever to extend the
powers of Congress. But that they may be construed either as making
exceptions to the specified powers where this shall be the case, or
otherwise as inserted merely for greater caution.
Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention (June 27, 1788), in CREATING
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 17, 21. Echoing this, Madison proposed
what developed into the Ninth Amendment:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor of
particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just
importance of other rights retained by the people; or as to enlarge the
powers delegated by the constitution; but either as actual limitations of
such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.
James Madison’s Resolution (June 8, 1789), in CREATING
supra note 43, at 11, 13.
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imply that unenumerated matters were within federal
power. Thus, when correctly understood, and especially as
clarified by the Ninth Amendment, the enumeration of rights
did not imply any additional federal power over any
unenumerated rights.
But this did not mean that the two types of rights had
the same structural relationship to federal power.
Enumerated rights carved out exceptions to federal power,
and federal power thus was subordinate to these rights. The
unenumerated rights, however, were both broader and
weaker. They amounted to all the liberty from the federal
government that remained after the Constitution granted
powers and subtracted rights, and therefore, far from being
exceptions from power, they were merely the remnants that
were left to the people beyond the power placed in the federal
government.
Enumerated rights thus were very different from
unenumerated rights. Whereas unenumerated rights were
defined by the limited federal powers, enumerated rights
trumped federal power.50
In sum, enumerated rights have a profound structural
relationship to government power. There is a long
constitutionalist tradition of viewing rights as trumps. More
particularly, in American constitutions, enumerated rights
are trumps. They carve out exceptions from government
power, and in this sense power is subject to rights.
II. INVERSION
Notwithstanding American constitutions, judicial
doctrine nowadays subordinates rights to government power.
Although constitutions still enumerate rights as exceptions
from power, and although judicial doctrine still recognizes
this up to a point, the doctrine then reintroduces questions of
government interests or power—thus allowing power to carve
out exceptions from the enumerated rights. The doctrine
50. Of course, unenumerated aspects of freedom are often protected by cases
that take broad interpretations of the enumerated rights, but the point here is
simply to understand how the Constitution structured rights and powers, not to
inquire whether unenumerated rights should be secured through broad
conceptions of the enumerated rights.
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thereby allows power to defeat any aspect of a right, not just
at its periphery, but even at its core. The result is to invert
the constitutional relationship of rights and powers, making
rights subordinate to the very powers they are meant to limit.
A. Compelling Government Interests
The primary mechanism by which enumerated rights are
subject to power is the doctrine on compelling government
interests. This doctrine is all about subordinating rights to
power.
In terms of legal realism, rights and powers are
competing “interests”—individuals having liberty interests
and government having government interests. It will be seen
in Part IV that constitutional powers and rights are not
merely interests; instead, they are spheres of authority, the
powers belonging to government, and the rights to those it
governs. Moreover, even if enumerated rights are interests,
they are not merely individual interests, for with few
exceptions, most such rights also belong to corporations and
other artificial persons. Nonetheless, the notion that rights
are individual interests and that powers are government
interests has become pervasive in judicial opinions, not least
those that allow government interests to trump individuals’
rights.
Of course, it may be doubted whether a government’s
claim about its interest is always a claim about its power. At
least in arguments about compelling government interests,
however, the claim about the government’s interest is really
a claim about its power—a power that defeats a competing
right. As put by the Supreme Court, the question is whether
there is a “compelling state interest in the regulation of a
subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate.”51
Thus, when a judge evaluates a government interest, he is
deciding whether the interest of the government in its power
trumps the interest of individuals in their rights.
Initially, this may seem surprising because the
compelling-government-interest test is presented as if it were
51. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (quoting NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
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especially protective of rights. The Supreme Court
emphasizes that “only” a compelling government interest can
defeat a right, and it frames the inquiry by saying that it is
exercising “strict scrutiny.”52 The judges thereby seem to be
reassuring themselves, and fellow Americans, that they are
doing all they can to protect constitutional rights.
But the compelling-government-interest test is
protective of rights only as compared to a looser balancing
test, not compared to the tradition that rights trump power.
And strict scrutiny is not really a heightened duty of
judgment or inquiry, but rather is merely a presumption in
favor of an enumerated right, until the right is defeated by a
government interest. Again, this is strict compared to mere
balancing, but not compared to the traditional trumping
effect of rights.
The compelling-government-interest test is thus less
protective than it purports to be. It is presented in
legitimizing ways, but in reality the test requires judges to
reject claims of right on account of claims of power.
In this way, the compelling-government-interest test
inverts the relation between rights and powers. Whereas
rights once rose above power, now power rises above rights.53

52. See, e.g., Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 895 (1990) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972); cf. United States v.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
53. Although the danger from this inversion of rights and powers usually goes
unrecognized, the Supreme Court glancingly noticed it in at least one case, United
States v. O’Brien. This was a prosecution of a man who had burned his draft card,
and it remains the leading case on expressive conduct—on conduct in which
“‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined.” O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77
(1968). As might be expected, the Court decided the case on the doctrine that “a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element
can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.” Id. at 376. The
Court ordinarily might have stopped with this, but because the right at stake in
O’Brien seemed so significant, the Court added that a regulation of expressive
conduct can be constitutional only if it furthers a government interest that is
“important or substantial” and is “unrelated to the suppression of free
expression.” Id. at 377. This insistence on an important government interest
unrelated to suppression was a departure from the usual doctrine on compelling
government interests, and it cannot easily be reconciled with the Constitution’s
apparently equal treatment of different rights. It at least, however, reveals some
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B. Balancing
The inversion of rights and power can also be observed in
the doctrine on “balancing”—the doctrine that allows
government interests to prevail where they simply outweigh
claims of liberty. Under this sort of test, the government
interest need not be particularly compelling; instead, it need
only outweigh the individual interests.
This balancing has flourished where the government
substitutes administrative process for the due process of law
in a court. Although the Supreme Court in Mathews v.
Eldridge states the doctrine in terms of three factors, the gist
of the doctrine is that the right must give way where a
government interest seems to have greater weight.54
The test first took hold in cases involving administrative
denials of benefits, and this is revealing, for these were cases
in which judges traditionally would have been skeptical of
the due process claim. There thus is reason to suspect that
courts valued the test for allowing government interests to
prevail where the courts were exploring the outer edges of
due process—that is, where a strong version of the right
would have seemed strained.
What began at the periphery, however, soon infected the
core. Although the balancing test started as an attempt to
delimit due process at its expanding periphery, it soon
eviscerated the very marrow of the right. To be concrete,
what began as a means of justifying the expansion of due
process to government benefits is now used to deny due
process for government constraints. The balancing test thus
slight recognition by the Court that there are risks in allowing a compelling
government interest to defeat rights.
54. In Eldridge, the Court recited these factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
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leaves open the possibility that government interests can
brush aside basic due process rights—as will be seen in detail
in Part VI.
In the meantime, it is enough to recognize that, in
balancing rights against government interests, this doctrine
inverts rights and power. Rights are now subject to power.
C. Equal Protection
A less central illustration of the inversion can be
observed in equal protection doctrine. It will be seen that
there are underlying justifications for much of what the
judges do in these cases. Nonetheless, equal protection
doctrine, as phrased by the judges, prominently contributes
to the inversion of rights and powers.
Under current judicial doctrine, judges evaluate equal
protection claims by considering whether they can be
defeated by a government interest. For example, where a
case involves a racial or other “suspect” classification, the
judges say they apply “strict scrutiny” and that the unequal
law can be upheld only where it is justified by a compelling
government interest. At the other end of the spectrum, if the
case does not involve a suspect classification, the judges
apply only their minimal degree of scrutiny, which can be
satisfied wherever the law has a “rational basis” in a
“legitimate state purpose.”55
Of course, judges in these equal protection cases are
doing something that arises out of the Equal Protection
Clause. Rather than bar state discrimination on the basis of
a specified characteristic, the Fourteenth Amendment
generally prohibits states from denying the equal protection
of the laws. The judges therefore need to sort out which
classifications matter and to what degree. For these
purposes, the judges assume that some classifications are
presumptively constitutional and others are presumptively
unconstitutional—this reliance on presumptions being why
the middle ground of “intermediate scrutiny” has always
seemed so uncomfortable.
55. As put in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 490 (1974) (quoting Aiello v.
Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792, 801 (N.D. Cal. 1973)), that there must be a “rational
and substantial relationship to a legitimate state purpose.”
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But it is a pity that the judges do not candidly admit that
they are relying on presumptions. The use of presumptions
in constitutional analysis is open to question. Nonetheless, a
candid recognition that this is what the judges are doing
would at least have the virtue of allowing them to reason
more openly about when a classification is presumptively
equal or unequal and when a statute’s use of a classification
cannot be presumed to fit the judges’ standard assumptions.
Instead, the judges put their analysis in terms of different
degrees of “scrutiny”—as if judges apply different degrees of
judgment in different cases. And they speak in terms of
rational bases and compelling government interests, thereby
legitimizing the notion that an enumerated right is subject to
government interests or power.
In short, the judges have good reason to resolve their
equal protection cases in terms of presumptions about
classifications. But when they say they engage in different
degrees of “scrutiny,” and then say that the results are
determined by rational bases or compelling government
interests, they lend support to the idea that power can thwart
an enumerated right.
D. Public Rights
A further example of how power nowadays defeats
enumerated rights can be found in the public rights doctrine.
Under this doctrine, the government’s pursuit of its “public
rights” in administrative adjudications defeats the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury. This is not the typical inversion
of rights and power, but it is interesting, for it reveals that
even when courts allow power to trump enumerated rights,
they sometimes find it advantageous to speak of the power as
if it were a matter of governmental or public “rights.”
In 1856, in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., the Supreme Court used the term “public
rights” to refer simply to the government’s lawful executive
power.56 In many instances, the executive could not act on its
56. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 275,
284 (1856). The term “public rights” as used in Murray’s Lessee has been
interpreted to mean, among other things, the private rights of persons
challenging the executive’s exercise of power. See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury
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own. For example, it could not promulgate a judicial edict
that constrained a member of the public; instead, it had to
persuade a court to try and punish the individual.
Nonetheless, in other ways, within parameters defined by the
Constitution and Congress, the executive often could act on
its own, without turning to the courts—for example, when
distributing benefits and other “privileges.”
Murray’s Lessee concerned one of these areas in which
the executive acted on its own—in this instance, to take
advantage of the self-help remedy known as “distress.”57 An
executive officer had issued a warrant authorizing a lesser
officer to distrain private property.58 When this was
challenged in court—on the ground that the executive had
exercised judicial power and thereby had deprived the
property owner of his due process of law, not to mention his
Seventh Amendment right to a jury—the Court upheld the
and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15 (1983). Upon close reading,
however, the relevant passage in Murray’s Lessee does not sustain this
interpretation:
[T]here are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in
such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which
are susceptible of judicial determination, but which Congress may or
may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States,
as it may deem proper. Equitable claims to land by the inhabitants of
ceded territories form a striking instance of such a class of cases; and as
it depends upon the will of Congress whether a remedy in the courts shall
be allowed at all, in such cases, they may regulate it and prescribe such
rules of determination as they may think just and needful. Thus it has
been repeatedly decided in this class of cases, that upon their trial the
acts of executive officers, done under the authority of Congress, were
conclusive.
Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 284.
There is an interesting question as to whether “public rights” were understood to
belong to the executive or the government as a whole. Undoubtedly, Congress
enjoys the power to authorize and limit a wide range of lawful executive actions,
and in this sense, Congress can shape or define the extent of public rights. But
the executive traditionally exercised the resulting power or “rights.” Although
nowadays some independent agencies also exercise what are considered public
rights, most of them are only partly independent, and in any case they can be
viewed as acting in place of the executive.
57. Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 274.
58. Id. at 274-75.
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distress warrant and subsequent distress as a matter of
“public right.”59
Murray’s Lessee has often been taken to justify
administrative adjudication—to suggest that there is a
general power or public right in the executive to issue judicial
edicts constraining members of the public without providing
a civil jury. But the Court in this case was merely upholding
the lawful power of the executive to use one of its traditional
self-help remedies. Distress was an ancient mode of self-help
execution that (at common law and eventually by statute)
was available to landlords when collecting unpaid rent, and
to the government when collecting unpaid taxes.60 In other
words, distress was not exclusively a governmental power.
Moreover, the distress warrant that was contested in
Murray’s Lessee was merely an executive instruction to a
lesser executive officer, authorizing and requiring him to
exercise the self-help remedy that the government had long
enjoyed, and because this was not “judicial power,” but
merely a lawful executive action, the Court concluded that
the executive was doing nothing more than exercising its
“public rights.”61 From this point of view, the government
exercised its public rights wherever the executive could
lawfully act on its own without turning to the courts—such
as where it distributed benefits or where, as here, it pursued
a traditional self-help remedy.
In the twentieth century, however, the Supreme Court
took a much broader view of “public rights.” Traditionally,
the executive had to go to the courts for adjudicatory edicts
that constrained members of the public, and thus (outside
equity and admiralty) it could not usually exercise power
domestically against Americans without persuading an
independent judge and jury. Nonetheless, the executive
increasingly has used its own, merely administrative
tribunals to issue binding edicts that constrain members of
the public—thus avoiding independent judges and juries.
59. Id. at 275-76, 285.
60. HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra note 15, at 216-17.
61. Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 284. For other skepticism about the standard
interpretation of Murray’s Lessee, based on other considerations, see Barbara
Aronstein Black, Who Judges? Who Cares? History Now and Then, 36 OHIO N.U.
L. REV. 749, 771-89 (2010).

760

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

This binding administrative adjudication runs outside the
Constitution’s path for judicial power, and it thereby evades
the Constitution’s procedural guarantees, including the
Seventh Amendment’s right to jury. Such an evasion of jury
rights traditionally would have been unconstitutional.
Accordingly, when the Supreme Court upheld this
administrative exercise of judicial power, it had to explain
how government power—indeed, an adjudicatory power that
ran outside the regular constitutional paths for such power—
could defeat the constitutional right to a jury.
The Court could have pretended that the Seventh
Amendment’s guarantee of juries “in Suits at common law”
assured Americans of civil juries only in the courts—thus
leaving them without such juries in administrative tribunals.
The Court understood, however, that this would have
perverted the amendment’s meaning. (Indeed, this would
have allowed the government to evade the jury requirement
wherever the government evades the courts, thus allowing
one violation of the Constitution to justify another.) It
therefore is no surprise that the Supreme Court recognized
the conflict between administrative proceedings and the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury, and that it needed to
find a way to justify the conflict.
The Court could have resolved the matter in terms of
mere power—saying that there was a compelling government
interest that outweighed the right. This, however, would
have invited a case-by-case analysis. Rather than go down so
tortuous a path, the Court settled the question with a
sweeping generalization.
It seized upon its phrase in Murray’s Lessee to cast the
government’s assertion of administrative power in terms of a
right, thereby attributing a right’s trumping effect to
government power. As put by the Court in Atlas Roofing v.
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, where
the government sues in its “sovereign capacity” to enforce
“public rights created by statutes . . . the Seventh
Amendment does not prohibit Congress from assigning the
fact-finding function and initial adjudication to an
administrative forum with which the jury would be
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incompatible.”62 In other words, when the government
exercises sovereign power against its people—at least when
it does so under statutory authority—its “public rights”
trump the right to a jury that the people secured for
themselves in their constitution.
Obviously, the statutory basis of a claim does not excuse
the government from complying with the Seventh
Amendment. What led to the adoption of the Amendment
were demands for jury rights generally in civil actions, and
the Amendment therefore guarantees juries in suits at
common law—that is, in all civil cases outside of equity and
admiralty—not merely in common law actions.63 It therefore
62. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 430 U.S.
442, 450 (1977).
63. The many demands for a guarantee of jury trial in civil cases can be
illustrated by the inquiry in the North Carolina ratifying convention, by Timothy
Bloodworth, whether “there be any security that we shall have juries in civil
causes. . . . [T]here is no provision made for having civil causes tried by jury.”
Speech of Bloodworth (July 28, 1778), in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 153-54 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836). Shortly after the adoption of the Bill of Rights, St. George
Tucker taught his students at William and Mary about how the Seventh and
Eighth Amendments secured “this mode of trial, as well in civil as in criminal
cases.” St. George Tucker, Law Lectures at William and Mary, Notebook 4, 14546 (c. 1790s) (unpublished Tucker-Coleman Papers) (located at the Earl Gregg
Swem Library at the College of William and Mary).
The Supreme Court once recognized the history. Justice Joseph Story explained
for the Court in 1830:
The phrase “common law,” found in this clause, is used in
contradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime
jurisprudence . . . . By common law, [the Framers of the Amendment]
meant . . . not merely suits, which the common law recognized among its
old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be
ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where
equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were
administered. . . . In a just sense, the amendment then may well be
construed to embrace all suits which are not of equity and admiralty
jurisdiction, whatever may be the peculiar form which they may assume
to settle legal rights.
Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 446-47 (1830) (emphasis omitted).
Long afterward, when the Supreme Court in Curtis v. Loether quoted this
passage, it drew the conclusion that “Mr. Justice Story established the basic
principle.” In fact, what the Court attributed to Story was the very point of
adopting the Seventh Amendment in 1789. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192-
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is strange and unconvincing to assume that the statutory
foundation of a claim is significant—as if a constitutional
right that excludes criminal, equitable, and admiralty
proceedings should be read to exclude the government’s
distinctively statutory claims.64
Ultimately, therefore, the Court’s conclusion in Atlas
comes to rest on the idea that sovereign public rights defeat
constitutional rights. On the Continent, in the absolutist
heritage of the civil law, prerogative or administrative
decisions on behalf of the government’s public power were
often said to be sovereign and thus superior to the rights of
private persons. But the whole point of the U.S. Constitution,
including the Seventh Amendment, is to establish and limit
the sovereign, not least by means of constitutional rights. It
therefore is entirely alien to the United States and its
constitution to conclude that the constitutional right to a jury
melts away before the sovereign’s “public rights.”
A range of judicial doctrines thus inverts rights and
power. Some doctrines speak of government “interests;”
another doctrine speaks in terms of “public rights;” but one
way or another the doctrines subject enumerated rights to
power, thereby inverting their relationship.
E. A Generic Government Power
Before leaving the doctrines that invert rights and power,
this Part must consider how the Supreme Court’s expansive
approaches to federal power have magnified the inversion.
The Court not only has taken a broad view of particular
federal powers but also has tended to generalize about a
generic government power, and all of this has profound
consequences.
Broad Interpretation of Particular Federal Powers. —It
is widely familiar that the Court takes a broad interpretation
of federal powers, particularly the powers of Congress. The
93 (1974) (upholding right to jury upon demand by either party in fair housing
claim for damages under Section 812 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968).
64. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Curtis v. Loether backed away from this
statutory reasoning, but not so clearly as to put an end to its significance, let alone
the authority of Atlas. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194 (1974).
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expansive implications for federal power are so familiar that
they scarcely require to be mentioned, but what requires
attention here are the narrowing implications for
enumerated rights.
Although the broad interpretation enlarges federal
powers, it thereby simultaneously reduces enumerated
rights. Under the traditional structural relationship between
rights and powers, an expansion of powers did not cut back
on the enumerated rights. Of course, the expanded powers
diminished the unenumerated rights—the undifferentiated
liberty that was left over after the enumeration of powers—
but because enumerated rights trumped powers, they were
unaffected by the expansion of power. Thus, when Congress
and the courts in the nineteenth century took ever broader
views of what Congress could do under the Commerce
Clause, there was a systematic loss in the unenumerated
liberty, but not in the enumerated rights.
This is changed, however, by the doctrine that compelling
government interests defeat enumerated rights. Now the
broadened federal powers establish not only the extent of
federal power but also the extent of the government interests
that overcome claims of enumerated rights. The broadening
of federal powers thus simultaneously expands these powers
and cuts back on enumerated rights.
Generic Government Power. —Of even greater import for
the inversion of rights and power is the tendency of the
Supreme Court, when applying the relevant doctrines, to
assume a generic government power. Whereas the
government’s enumerated powers are subject to the
enumerated rights, the rights then are in turn subject to
generic government power.
Rather than grant Congress a general legislative power,
the Constitution grants Congress a series of enumerated
powers. Thus, even if courts were justified in subjecting
enumerated rights to compelling government interests, they
would be justified only to the extent they limited any such
reasoning to the interests of the government in its
enumerated powers. When applying its doctrines that invert
rights and power, however, the Supreme Court does not pay
much attention to different federal powers, but instead tends
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to generalize about government power, as if rights were
subject to a generic government power.
One explanation is that the Court has interpreted some
grants of congressional power—notably the Commerce
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause—so broadly
that (as a practical matter) Congress now has a nearly
general legislative power.65 Another explanation is that the
Court most commonly inverts rights and power in reaching
decisions about state laws. A state’s legislature typically
enjoys a generic legislative power under its state
constitution, and thus whenever state laws come into conflict
with the U.S. Bill of Rights as “incorporated” against the
states, the Court tends to think about rights in terms of the
generic government interest that it associates with state
legislatures. By this means, the Court has become
accustomed to assuming that rights are subject to a general
government interest, and thus even when applying the
balancing and compelling-government-interest tests to
federal violations of rights, it continues to assume a generic
government interest.66
Of course, there are layers of explanations, and another,
more sobering layer will be considered later (in the
Appendix), but for now it is enough to observe the result:
Even when a right is claimed against the federal government,
the judges subject the right not merely to the government’s
interests in its enumerated powers, but more broadly to a
generic government interest or power. In other words,
regardless of whether state or federal power is introduced to
defeat claims of rights, the rights remain plural, but the
government interest that can defeat them usually gets
expanded to a single generic governmental interest.
The breadth of this government interest that can defeat
rights is worrisome, for on account of its generality it is not
clear how it is limited. At the federal level, the result is not
merely an inversion that subjects the enumerated rights to
the enumerated powers, but a more profound inversion that

65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
66. The primary exception is United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77
(1968); see supra note 53.
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subordinates the enumerated rights to a generic federal
power not contemplated by the Constitution.
The
relevant
doctrines—those
on
compellinggovernment-interests, balancing, equal protection, and
public rights—thus have an even more emphatic effect than
would otherwise be expected. They invert not merely rights
and powers, but rights and a single generic power.
III. PLACE OF INTERESTS IN UNDERSTANDING RIGHTS
Notwithstanding what the judges say they are doing, it
may be supposed that they actually are taking government
interests into account merely to understand rights and, in
particular, their definition. Certainly, interests have a place
in attempts to understand rights. But when the judges
candidly allow government interests or power to cut off
claims of rights, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, in
both form and reality, they are subordinating rights to power,
thereby inverting their relationship.
A. Inverting Rather Than Defining
Government interests do more than merely help judges
understand rights and their definition. As already suggested,
they often defeat rights.
The structure of the Court’s compelling-governmentinterest test already reveals that the Court is really allowing
power to trump rights, for the test introduces government
power at a late stage of constitutional analysis, after the
individual’s “interest” or right has been acknowledged. When
a judge decides the constitutionality of a government act
under the test, he must begin by asking whether the
government acted within one of its enumerated powers. The
judge must then inquire whether the relevant power is
limited by a constitutional right—or as put by the judges,
whether the individual has a constitutionally protected
interest. Under the Court’s test, however, the judge then
must add a third step: He must inquire whether there is a
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government interest that defeats the individual interest.67 He
thereby reopens the question of power to defeat the claim of
a right.
This is not only the form but also the reality of how the
compelling-government-interest test is typically used. Far
from assisting in the definition of a right, the test has the
effect of liberating judges to take very broad or vague
conceptions of rights. It assures them that, however broad or
uncertain their definition of a right, they can rely on
compelling government interests to prevent any untoward
consequences. It thus is no coincidence that this test has
flourished when, during the last half-century, judges have
taken expansive conceptions of some rights. Rather than a
means of defining constitutional rights, government interests
serve as a means of containing rights when their expansive
definitions go too far.
The inversion becomes explicit in free exercise cases. The
judges who have interpreted the free exercise of religion
expansively, as a constitutional right of exemption, have
tended to state that the right itself—not merely a claim to
the right—is defeated by government interests. It already
has been observed how the Supreme Court in Sherbert v.
Verner said that a compelling government interest “justifies
the substantial infringement of appellant’s First Amendment

67. The Constitution itself does not use interest analysis to define either
powers or rights, but to the extent it comes close to such analysis, it does so in
connection with powers rather than rights—in the Necessary and Proper Clause.
This clause authorizes Congress to make all laws “necessary and proper” for
carrying out other powers, and it thus could be viewed as defining congressional
power by reference to federal interests. James Madison understood this clause in
terms of “the means of attaining the object of the general power,” and John
Marshall later observed that it provided the “means” of effectuating “the
legitimate objects of the Government.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 304 (James
Madison) (Cooke ed., 1961); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 422-23
(1819). From this point of view, the enumerated powers of Congress are really the
government’s legitimate objects, ends, or interests.
Even in the Necessary and Proper Clause, however, when government powers are
a measure, they are part of a means-ends analysis rather than a balancing
analysis, and they are a measure of power rather than of rights. The Necessary
and Proper Clause therefore offers little legitimacy for weighing government
interests against rights.
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right.”68 Other free exercise cases confirm the Court’s candid
subordination of the right to government interests. For
example, in Bob Jones University v. United States, the Court
summarized that “[t]he state may justify a limitation on
religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish
an overriding governmental interest.”69
Of course, as the judges explained in one of the religious
exemption cases, Wisconsin v. Yoder, “only those interests of
the highest order and those not otherwise served can
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of
religion.”70 In the words of Justice O’Connor, when concurring
in Employment Division v. Smith, “[o]nly an especially
important governmental interest pursued by narrowly
tailored means can justify exacting a sacrifice of First
Amendment freedoms.”71 It is not reassuring, however, that
only an important government interest can require an
infringement or sacrifice of First Amendment freedoms, for
the general message is that interests do not merely help to
understand the rights, but rather serve as a means of
denying them.
As an illustration of how rights are not merely defined,
but defeated by government interests, the free exercise
doctrine is particularly interesting, because the Supreme
Court has changed its views about the extent of the right.
Until the mid-twentieth century, the Court understood the
right as a freedom under general laws regardless of one’s
religious beliefs. Beginning at least in Sherbert in 1963,
however, the Court held that the right included at least some
freedom from general laws on account of one’s religious
beliefs, and to delimit this expanded freedom, it held that in
68. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (recognizing free exercise right
of exemption from general law on unemployment benefits).
69. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603 (1983) (quoting United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982)) (upholding IRS interpretation of
§501(c)(3) denying tax exempt status to racially discriminatory university).
70. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (recognizing free exercise
right of exemption for Amish from general laws on education).
71. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 895 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 728 (1986)) (rejecting free exercise right of
exemption).
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some instances a compelling government interest “justifies
the substantial infringement of appellant’s First Amendment
right.”72 Since then, in Smith in 1990, it has largely
repudiated the Sherbert freedom from general laws.
Although there have been statutory and judicial attempts to
restore that broader freedom, the Court has not, thus far,
constitutionally restored the more expansive freedom.73
Strikingly, however, although the Court has retreated to
the more modest conception of free exercise, it has continued
(as will be seen in Part VI.B) to assume that compelling
government interests can defeat the right to free exercise.
Thus, the candid inversion of rights and power, which
entered the case law to render the expanded right plausible,
still persists even after the right has returned to its more
modest size. The inversion is no longer required by a broad
definition of free exercise, but it remains because it has
become part the Court’s generic approach to rights.
In sum, rather than a means of understanding the
definition of rights, the compelling-government-interest test
and other modes of inversion are means of defeating rights.
Sometimes, the Court simply says that the claim of a right
will not prevail because of a compelling government interest;
sometimes it goes so far as to say that the right must be
“infringed” or “sacrificed” because of such an interest. One
way or another, government interest or power defeats rights.

72. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406. Earlier, in Braunfeld v. Brown, Justice Brennan
dissented on the free exercise question by asking: “[w]hat, then, is the compelling
state interest which impels the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to impede
appellants’ freedom of worship? What overbalancing need is so weighty in the
constitutional scale that it justifies this substantial, though indirect, limitation of
appellants’ freedom?” 366 U.S. 599, 610, 613-14 (1961) (upholding Sunday law
against free exercise challenge by Orthodox Jews).
73. Smith, 406 U.S. at 884-85. The public attempts include the legislation—
notably the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4
(2012), and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 (2012). The judicial attempts are more subtle but probably
can be discerned in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 533-34, 542 (1993); for details see Part VI.B below.
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B. The Limited Role of Interests
What then is the role of government interests in
understanding rights? Such interests are important, but this
is not to say they should trump rights.
Theory. —Legal theory has long recognized that interests
and other aspects of utility or expedience can, and probably
should, enter into the decision as to whether a claim should
be established as a legal right. But at least in AngloAmerican legal theory, there has been a tradition of
recognizing that, once a right is established, it cuts off further
consideration of such interests.
Of course, when one right collides with another right—as
when one property right collides with another property
right—the question becomes more complicated. Along similar
lines, when the government claims what it calls a “public
right” in opposition to a privately-held constitutional right, it
disturbs the clarity that the constitutional right is trumps—
a danger seen in Atlas Roofing.74 But there is a long tradition
in Anglo-American constitutional law and legal theory of
assuming that, although utilitarian analysis should be part
of the decision to establish a right, the right then cuts off
further consideration of utilitarian concerns.
This point was notably expounded in 1791 by the political
theorist James Mackintosh. After Edmund Burke
condemned the French Revolution, Mackintosh argued in his
Vindiciæ Gallicæ that some rights (such as the freedom from
slavery) were universal.75 Although his 1791 argument
espoused universal rather than civil rights, what matters
here is his observation about the structure of rights—that
notwithstanding underlying considerations of expedience, a
right (after it has been recognized) is impervious to such
considerations.76
74. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 430 U.S.
442, 450 (1977).
75. JAMES MACKINTOSH, VINDICÆ GALLICÆ 213-14 (Woodstock Books 1989)
(1791).
76. See id.
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Mackintosh began with rules of morality. “All morality
is, no doubt, founded on a broad and general expediency,” and
in this sense, “[j]ustice is expediency.”77 Yet “it is expediency,
speaking by general maxims,” and the expedience of the
maxim or rule overrides the expedience that could, in some
instances, cut against it—this being what nowadays is often
called “rule utilitarianism”:
Every general principle of justice is demonstrably expedient, and it
is this utility alone that confers on it a moral obligation. But it
would be fatal to the existence of morality, if the utility of every
particular act were to be the subject of deliberation in the mind of
every moral agent. A general moral maxim is to be obeyed, even if
the inutility is evident, because the precedent of deviating more
than balances any utility that may exist in the particular
deviation.78

In other words, there is a weighty interest in having moral
rules.
This approach also applied to rights: The assertion of “a
right to life, liberty, &c. . . . [based] on general interest . . .
prohibits any attack on these possessions,” for an attack
based on interest, expedience, or utility in any particular
instance does not outweigh the deeper utility of preserving
the right.79 Mackintosh therefore held that in a “primary and
radical sense, all rights, natural as well as civil, arise from
expediency. But the moment the moral edifice is reared, its
basis is hid from the eye forever.”80 Speaking of universal
rights, Mackintosh concluded that “[t]he moment these
maxims, which are founded on an utility that is paramount
and perpetual, are embodied and consecrated, they cease to
77. Id. at 215-16.
78. Id. at 216. Mackintosh was a lawyer, and his point here echoes an old
common law adage that “[a] mischief shall be rather suffered than an
inconvenience”—meaning that “it is better to suffer a mischief to a particular
person that may be wronged, than to suffer a general inconvenience,” such as
departing from a rule. 6 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF
AMERICAN LAW 431 (Boston, Cummings, Hilliard, & Co. 1824); Gwanralt v.
Burwall et al Censors de le Coll de Physitians & Cose their Servant (K.B. 1700),
in British Library, Holt’s Opinions, Add. Ms. 35980, fol. 125v.
79. MACKINTOSH, supra note 75, at 216-17.
80. Id. at 217.
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yield to partial and subordinate expediency.”81 As applied to
universal rights, Mackintosh’s argument opens up more
questions than it resolves, but at least it suggests how rights
can be founded on considerations of utility while
simultaneously cutting off such considerations. Once a right
is established—in this Article, once it is enumerated—it
defeats contrary utilitarian concerns.
There is a time for weighing government interests, and a
time for putting them aside. Enumerated rights define the
time when government interests must be put aside.
Lawmaking v. Judging: The Dangers of Government
Interests as a Judicial Measure of Rights. —The traditional
Anglo-American theory of rights gives the consideration of
interests an institutional location, mainly in the lawmaking
body. There is not only a time but also a place for weighing
government interests.
Lawmaking, including the lawmaking done by the people
in adopting a constitution, involves a careful weighing of
government interests. When the people have acted as
lawmaker in guaranteeing constitutional rights, they
traditionally have been expected to consider government
interests, so as to avoid guaranteeing rights that might
interfere with essential government power. From this
perspective, when James Madison introduced the Bill of
Rights, he and his fellow Federalists carefully limited the
rights to avoid undermining the broader interests of the
federal government, and as a result, the Bill of Rights largely
sidestepped this danger.82
81. Id.
82. Madison had opposed a bill of rights and only reluctantly was brought
around to support it—initially to satisfy constituents and then to reconcile AntiFederalists to the new constitution. Kenneth R. Bowling, “A Tub to the Whale:”
The Founding Fathers and Adoption of the Federal Bill of Rights, 8 J. EARLY
REPUBLIC 223, 231-32 (1988); Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of
Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 302-03, 341 (1991). Having
thereby become the primary mover for the Bill of Rights, he needed to satisfy
himself and his fellow Federalists that the enumerated rights would not
undermine the Constitution’s powers and other structures. For example, when
introducing the Bill of Rights on the floor of the House of Representatives, he
argued the amendments could guard against abuse of federal powers “while no
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Of course, the judges sometimes make constitutional law
in their decisions, and in such instances they, too, as
lawmakers, need to consider government interests. The
judges, however, apply one or another of the doctrines that
invert rights and power not merely when they clearly make
law, but whenever a claim of constitutional rights comes
before them. It therefore is difficult to believe that the
inverting doctrines merely reflect the judges’ alleged
lawmaking role. In most cases, the judges appear to be
almost exclusively applying the law; in almost all cases,
moreover, the judges are unwilling to say that they are
making law. Therefore, in almost all cases in which the
judges apply the inverting doctrines, it is not evident that the
judges have a lawmaker’s need to consider government
interests.
Indeed, the traditional ideal among common lawyers has
been for judges to take only very limited cognizance of
government interests. Judges have long examined utilitarian
concerns, including government interests. They ordinarily,
however, were to rely on utility not as the measure of a power
or right, but rather merely as the means of illuminating dark
corners—as a means of illuminating unsettled questions,
whether about common law or legislative intent.83
Even then, utility itself was expected to be only a
secondary consideration. It was not ultimately the boundary
of a power or right, but rather was a means of determining
whether or not to adopt a doctrinal boundary. This judicial
advantage, arising from the exercise of that power, shall be damaged or
endangered by it.” Speech of James Madison (June 8, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL
OF RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 79. He added:
We have in this way something to gain, and, if we proceed with caution,
nothing to lose; and in this case it is necessary to proceed with caution;
for while we feel all these inducements to go into a revisal of the
constitution, we must feel for the constitution itself, and make that
revisal a moderate one. I should be unwilling to see a door opened for a
re-consideration of the whole structure of the government, for a reconsideration of the principles and the substance of the powers given.
Id.
Similarly, see id., at 79-80.
83. See HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY, supra note 25, at 336-44.
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consideration of utility was what one would expect where
judges came close to making law. Not surprisingly, it was to
be a one-time event, and after judges had done it, they were
to follow their doctrinal measure, not the utility.84 Along
similar lines, government interests should not be the
measure of a right; instead, they should be me rely a means
of testing the plausibility of a proposed understanding of a
right.
Moreover, rather than show, in a positive way, what
judges should adopt as a doctrinal measure, utility was
ideally only a negative indicator—a gauge of implausibility.
Indeed, far from a refined indicator of this sort, it was an
indicator of radical implausibility. For example, inutility
could show what constituted an absurd interpretation of a
statute’s intent or an unreasonable understanding of a
common law rule.85
Any more ambitious consideration of government
interests is apt to be dangerous. Especially when government
interests are elevated as a measure of enumerated rights,
there is a risk that they will defeat rights—that the rights
will be subordinate to power, thus inverting their
relationship.
Hence, the submerged role of government interests.
When lawmakers guarantee rights, they need to avoid
guaranteeing rights so broadly as to interfere in essential
government powers, and when judges discern rights, they
need to consider government interests to double check the
plausibility of their understandings of the rights. But
enumerated rights cannot be measured in ways that more
84. This assumption was reflected, for example, in the expectation that judges
should suffer a mischief in a particular case rather than the inconvenience of
departing from a rule. See supra note 78. Once a rule was established, the judges
tended to say, as in Slade’s Case, “we cannot change the law now, for that would
be inconvenient.” Slade’s Case, 4 Co. Rep. 92b, 93b-94b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074, 107677 (K.B. 1602). See generally HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY, supra note 25,
at 127.
85. Of course, utility could indirectly have a more positive role because natural
law theory included a stylized account of utility, and some Anglo-American
commentators (usually those attracted to the academic learning of the Roman
civil law) said that judges should look to natural law or justice to fill gaps where
common law or a statute was indeterminate. This, however, offered only a very
indirect role for utility.
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ambitiously consider government interests—in ways that
elevate government interests as a judicial measure of
rights—without undermining the very function of the rights
in limiting power.
C. Functionalism and the Forms of Law
The compelling-government-interest test and other
inversions of rights and power can all be understood as
functionalist alternatives to more formal approaches to
understanding rights. It therefore is important to recognize
that the risk is just as great when rights are said to be subject
to functionalist reasoning about the needs of society or when
rights are otherwise measured by public or majority
perceptions of social or governmental needs.
Lawyers, especially legal academics, often pursue
functionalist reasoning in ways that override constitutional
text, doctrine, and other forms of law. This approach typically
is justified as necessary for recognizing social realities and
overcoming the rigidity of the forms of law.86
At least, however, where rights are protected by the
forms of law—for example, where rights are protected by
being enumerated—this functionalist reasoning comes with
risks. Rights become insecure when they are open to
functionalist reconsideration on the basis of government
interests, let alone majority, populist, or judicial perceptions
of such interests, and this is what sometimes happened when
the Supreme Court allowed government interests to trump
enumerated rights. The functionalism became an avenue for
inverting rights and power—indeed, for subjecting rights to
a majoritarian, populist, or judicial veto, exercised by judges
in their perceptions of the functional need for the trumping
power.
Thus, at least as to rights, the functionalist reasoning
does not merely overcome the forms of law; it also defeats
86. For the development of functionalist analysis among American political
scientists, see DANIEL T. RODGERS, CONTESTED TRUTHS 162-63 (1987). Rodgers
notes that “[t]hey preferred to talk in terms of the ‘functions’ of the State, rather
than the harder lawyers’ language of limits or spheres.” Id. at 163. As it happens,
the functionalist mode of speaking was borrowed from German scholarship, and
it soon was adopted by American lawyers. For details, see HAMBURGER, IS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra note 15, at 468-71.
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rights, subordinating them to power. Of course, functionalist
reasoning about government interests has its place in the
judicial analysis of rights. But if judges are to avoid
subjecting rights to power, they cannot enact, define,
measure, interpret, or otherwise deal with enumerated rights
in ways that subject rights to government interests,
functions, or other considerations of power.
IV. STRUCTURALLY ABSOLUTE
The subordination of rights to power tends to be defended
on the ground that rights are not absolute. This justification,
however, tends to conflate the metaphysical question with
the structural question. The question of whether rights are
metaphysically absolute is not at stake here; nor should it be.
Instead, the question is whether rights are structurally
absolute.
A. Structurally Absolute
There is much to be said for the conclusion that rights
are not absolute. Little is known or even knowable with
certainty, and if this is true even in the physical world, it
surely is all the more true in the moral and legal sphere. Even
merely as a heuristic, metaphysical doubts about absolutes
are a useful caution against dogmatism. But an antiabsolutist vision can itself become dogmatic—for example,
when it is applied too sweepingly in practical matters such
as law. All sorts of things are absolute in small ways, and in
this spirit it can be recognized that, even if rights are not
metaphysically absolute, they can be legally absolute in the
structural sense that they trump other claims—in this
instance, claims of government interests or power.
The law is full of mechanisms by which some claims
systematically defeat others. Conditional gifts are subject to
conditions, and conditions thus systematically trump
property interests in gifts. Leases and other contracts
structure the order of contractual claims, thereby allowing
some property or contract rights to prevail over others. Under
the Supremacy Clause, state power is subject to federal law,
and acts of Congress thus systematically trump state
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statutes.87 It thus is evident that much in law is absolute in
the sense of systematically defeating certain other claims,
and this is most profoundly true of enumerated
constitutional rights in relation to government.
These rights were characteristically absolute because
they were designed as limits on government. It is commonly
said that rights belong to individuals—thus justifying the
notion that rights are “individuals’ interests”—and certainly
some rights are based on individualistic ideas. The
Constitution, however, generally does not enumerate rights
specifically for individuals, and this makes sense, for the
Constitution guarantees rights not simply to protect
individuals, but more generally to limit government.
Although the First Amendment includes rights of
religion and speech that may be thought peculiarly
individualistic, the amendment is framed not in
individualistic terms but as a limit on power. Indeed, it
begins, not “Individuals shall have the right . . .,” but rather
“Congress shall make no law . . . .”88 The Second through
Eighth Amendments, moreover, protect rights almost
entirely in the passive voice—thereby limiting all parts of
government and leaving open the opportunity for anyone
within the jurisdiction of American law (even if not a citizen
or even an individual) to claim the protected rights.89 As a
87. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
88. U.S. CONST. amend I.
89. On the passive voice of most enumerated rights, the scholarship of Nicholas
Rosenkranz is valuable. But rather than accept the implication that, for example,
the procedural amendments thereby limit all parts of government, his work
suggests that each of the passive guarantees mainly limits a single part of
government other than Congress—for example that the Due Process Clause “is
essentially a restriction on what the executive branch may do in the absence of a
law.” Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution, 63 STAN. L.
REV. 1005, 1042 (2011). Although this is important in recognizing the passive
voice, it takes too narrow a view of the significance. For example, a court surely
can violate due process by condemning a defendant without trial, and Congress
can violate it by authorizing such proceedings.
As for the location of the Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments originally were
distributed within the first three articles of the body of the Constitution but then
were collected together and placed at the end as the Bill of Rights. The decision
of Congress in 1789 to locate the amendments at the end of the Constitution
rather than to interweave them into the document has been described as merely
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practical matter some rights (such as habeas) are relevant
only for individuals, and as legal matter rights can be claimed
in court only by persons of one sort or another. Otherwise,
however, there usually is no additional requirement in the
first eight amendments that claimants be persons, let alone
individuals.90
It thus appears that the enumerated rights are not
merely “individual interests,” which can be trumped by
government interests. On the contrary, they are small
spheres of authority from which the government is barred. It
has vast powers through which it can assert its interests, but
it has no lawful interest or power in these little realms of
freedom.
Of course, where it seems necessary, the Constitution
allows government interests to intrude on rights, but it must
do this expressly. For example, it expressly allows the
government to suspend habeas and to quarter soldiers in
houses, but only in extreme circumstances, as authorized by
statute.91 Absent such caveats, when the Constitution
“arbitrary.” Mehrdad Payandeh, Constitutional Aesthetics: Appending
Amendments to the United States Constitution, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 87, 90 (2011).
But the central implication of this shift was to clarify that the rights stated in the
passive voice would limit all parts of government. If added to Article I, a
procedural right stated in the passive voice would have limited only Congress,
and if added to Article III, it would have limited only the courts, but when added
in a bill of rights at the end of the Constitution, it limited all parts of the
government.
90. The point that corporations are not excluded from claiming constitutional
rights is partly recognized in Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). The
point, however, is broader, as suggested in the text. Moreover, it is supported by
much detailed historical evidence. For example, the claims for religious liberty
leading up to the adoption of the First Amendment were typically made not by
individuals but by churches, church associations, presbyteries, and incorporated
religious bodies, and other religious societies of varying sorts.
91. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; U.S. CONST. amend. III. Although since the time of
Lincoln it has been disputed whether only Congress can suspend habeas, the
earlier history left little doubt on this, for habeas was protected by an act of
Parliament, and it therefore needed an act of Parliament to suspend it—a
conclusion that became all the more clear when the king’s suspension power came
to be recognized as unlawful. See Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 1823, 1908-09, 1917-21 (2009). For examples of how early
American states relied on legislation to suspend the writ, see Amanda L. Tyler,
Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 Yale L.J. 600, 622-27 (2009); Amanda L.
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guarantees rights, it bars the government from exercising
any authority within these protected spheres of authority.
Structurally, therefore, enumerated rights are
supplementary limits on government. The Constitution
places layers of legal limits on the federal government. It
sketches out federal power with the broad brushstrokes of
enumerated powers, which confine the government to a
specialized set of powers. It then uses enumerated rights to
pencil in more detailed limits. The rights thus are additional
limits on government, and to the extent the Constitution
establishes such rights, they absolutely limit government.
The expansive interpretation of federal powers has made
the absolute character of enumerated rights all the more
important. As already noted (in Part II.E), broad
interpretations of the Commerce Clause and the Necessary
and Proper Clause have given the federal government a
nearly general power, and the government therefore is no
longer much limited by the enumeration of its powers.
Consequently, the enumerated rights, although once only
secondary limits on federal power, have become the primary
limits.
These rights are now the front-line barriers to federal
power.92 It therefore is essential that they be understood as
superior to power—that they be understood as structurally
absolute.
B. Middle Ground
One might suppose that when the Supreme Court
inquires about government interests, it is attempting to split
the difference between rights and powers—that it is not
establishing either over the other. In theory, so balanced an
approach may be possible. The Supreme Court, however,
Tyler, The Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension Clause, 125 HARV. L. REV.
901, 958 (2012). For more information on the power to suspend laws in England
and America, see HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra note 15,
at 65-82.
92. Of course, like all governments, the United States is subject to a host of
structural, political, and other practical constraints, and in this sense, like other
governments, the extent of its power cannot be judged simply by the legal limits
imposed by the Constitution. For purposes, however, of understanding the lawful
extent of its power, its legal powers and the legal limits on them are what matter.
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frames most of its relevant doctrines in terms of the trumping
force of power. And in any case the Constitution sets a baseline: against the background of the Constitution, which
elevates rights over powers, the Court’s doctrines clearly
have the effect of elevating power over rights.
For example, in the balancing test used to determine
whether administrative determinations satisfy the due
process of law, the Court gives no greater priority to either
power or rights, and this therefore may seem a genuine
middle ground. But against the background of the
Constitution’s protection of rights as exceptions from power,
the effect of the balancing test is to undermine the protection
for rights by opening up the possibility that power can defeat
them. Another example is the compelling-governmentinterests test. Rather than establish a middle ground
between rights and powers, it acknowledges merely an initial
presumption in favor of rights and then allows the
presumption to be overcome by the argument for power.
Moreover, in contrast to the Constitution’s treatment of
rights, the test makes government interests decisive
whenever they are sufficiently strong.
Of course, the Court allows power to trump rights only
where the need for the power seems pressing, but this does
not mean that the Court has not made power trumps. The
whole point of the doctrines on balancing, compelling
interests, and public rights is to allow claims of power to
prevail over claims of rights. Rather than use rights as a
measure of power, the Court relies on power as a measure of
rights.
C. Little Realms of Liberty
The structurally absolute character of enumerated rights
is plausible only because American constitutional rights
merely carve out small realms of liberty. The modest
character of such rights is often forgotten, but it needs to be
recalled if their absolute character is to be recognized as
realistic.
Spheres of Authority. —A starting point for
understanding the modesty of American constitutional rights
is that they generally do not guarantee substantive
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rationality or justice. Instead, on the whole, they merely
carve out spheres of authority or freedom.
Where a legal system attempts to sort out the
substantive justice between two parties, let alone between a
people and their government, it can be difficult to discern
unconditional or absolute legal rights. Even in the least
complicated circumstances, substantive justice is complex,
and substantive justice thus tends to preclude carving out
any simple sphere of authority.
Anglo-American law, however, has often traditionally
allocated absolute spheres of authority. Whereas the civil law
frequently elaborated complex substantive rules of justice,
thus making it difficult to acknowledge unconditional rights,
the common law more typically demarcated relatively clearcut rights. Put another way, the common law was often more
procedural than substantive. For example, the common law
laid down the flat rule that when a donor makes a conditional
gift and the donee breaches the condition, the donor has a
right to recover the property.93 The common law does not
thereby avoid the pursuit of justice, but rather recognizes
that, in a complex society, in which individuals value
freedom, justice often is best achieved by leaving persons free
to pursue their different visions of justice through their
spheres of liberty.94
This point about the common law stands in contrast to
contemporary legal theory. In such theory, rights tend to be
understood as avenues for reasons or reasoning, and it
therefore is unsurprising that the theory does not often linger
on the possibility that rights can be absolute.95 The common
93. In contrast, in the civil law, such a gift must be made with the participation
of a third party, a notary.
94. See Philip Hamburger, Judicial Office, 6 J.L. PHIL. & CULTURE 53, 69-70
(2011).
95. Pildes, Dworkin’s Two Conceptions of Rights, supra note 4 at 311-12
(“[R]ights are not justified as all-purpose shields,” but “channel the kinds of
reasons upon which the state can constitutionally act . . . .”); Pildes, Why Rights
are not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism,
supra note 4, at 729 (“Rights are not general trumps against appeals to the
common good or anything else; instead, they are better understood as channeling
the kinds of reasons government can invoke when it acts in certain arenas.”);
Waldron, supra note 4, at 305 (not dissenting from Pildes’s view that “[r]ights are
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law, however, has often treated rights as little realms of
freedom in which the rights holders can act as they please.96
Seeking this sort of protection for constitutional rights,
not merely a protection for what was reasonable, Patrick
Henry rejected a system in which “[p]ower and privilege . . .
depended on implication and logical discussion.”97 “Reason”
was one of the things that “powerfully urge us to secure the
dearest rights of human nature,” but reason by itself was no
protection.98 From this perspective, Henry protested that a
right such as religious liberty “ought not to depend on
constructive logical reasoning.”99 He illustrated the point by
reading the Virginia Declaration of Rights and then asking,
“[w]ill they exchange these rights for logical reasons?”100
Henry’s view of enumerated rights as the legal protection
for little spheres of freedom, not as paths for reasoning, was
typical of eighteenth century Americans. Most of them
understood their ideas of legal rights to be founded on reason.
Most of them, however, also thought that reason revealed the
necessity of securing protection for freedom through
expressly enumerated constitutional rights.
Once this is recognized, one can begin to understand how
enumerated rights can be absolute. Madison, for example,
understood enumerated rights to “limit and qualify the
powers of government, by excepting out of the grant of power
those cases in which the government ought not to act, or to
act only in a particular mode.”101 When understood in this
ways to channel the kinds of reasons and justifications government can act on in
different domains”).
96. Indeed, the common law treats most rights and even many things that are
not quite rights as spheres of authority. See HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY,
supra note 25, at 47, 619; Hamburger, Judicial Office, supra note 94, at 59-60,
67-68.
97. Speech of Patrick Henry, Va. Ratifying Convention (June 12, 1788), in 10(3)
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 41, at 1211-13.
98. Id. at 1211.
99. Id. at 1213.
100. Id.
101. Although Madison was speaking of state bills of rights, he was relying on
them to explain the proposed U.S. Bill of Rights. Speech of James Madison (June
8, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 81.
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way, enumerated rights do not necessarily demarcate what
is right, let alone what is right in each circumstance. Instead,
they carve out little spheres of liberty from the mass of
government powers, and because they thus establish rights
rather than what is substantively right, they have the
potential to be guaranteed absolutely.
Overstated Powers and Understated Rights. —Another
modest feature of American constitutional rights, which also
makes it possible for them to be absolute, is that they are
understated.
Indeed,
American
constitutions
characteristically combine overstated powers with
understated rights.
Constitutional power must be broadly stated, even
overstated, because it is not possible ahead of time to
anticipate the exact range of power the government will need
to defend the society and preserve its interests. A
constitution that stated powers too narrowly would run the
risk of putting the government in the position of having to
violate the law, and therefore, precisely to preserve the law,
a constitution must lean toward overstatement in granting
powers.
Similarly, to avoid the risk that rights will stand in the
way of an essential exercise of power, and that government
will therefore be tempted to violate rights, a constitution
must tend toward understating rights. As James Madison
explained in 1788 to Thomas Jefferson, if the Bill of Rights
was drafted too broadly, the government in dire exigencies
would be unable to avoid violating what was guaranteed:
Supposing a bill of rights to be proper[,] the articles which ought to
compose it, admit of much discussion. I am inclined to think that
absolute restrictions in cases that are doubtful, or where
emergencies may overrule them, ought to be avoided. The
restrictions however strongly marked on paper will never be
regarded when opposed to the decided sense of the public; and after
repeated violations in extraordinary cases, they will lose even their
ordinary efficacy.102

102. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295, 299 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977).
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To be sure, there also is a risk in understating rights, as
Madison understood.103 But the structural risk in relation to
powers is in overstating rights, for this invites the
government to conclude that its essential interests require it
to override rights, thus subjecting them to power and
weakening the ideal of constitutional governance.104 To avoid
these risks of overstatement, Madison ensured that the
enumerated rights carve out only little realms of liberty, and
this is why they can be structurally absolute.
The federal government and the states enjoy vast
powers, which they can exercise with vigor. From this great
mass of power, the enumerated rights remove only a few
small spheres of liberty. It surely, therefore, is not too much
to maintain these rights as structurally absolute in relation
to power.
D. The Changed Character of Rights
The inversion of the Constitution’s enumerated rights
alters their character. Whereas such rights once secured
spheres of liberty regardless of government power, they now
merely begin conversations about the government’s interests
or power.
Of course, as noted in Part III, government interests are
central for determining what should be protected as a right.
Recognizing this, the early Americans who framed and
ratified the Constitution and its Bill of Rights repeatedly
worried about whether the enumerated rights would collide
103. Madison feared this especially as to “the rights of conscience.” Id. at 298.
104. This point about overstated powers and understated rights was frequently
discussed by the framers in terms of establishing a “permanent” constitution.
Most of them hoped for a constitution that would be relatively permanent, in the
sense that it would not have to change with the development of society. In other
words, they wanted a constitution that, already at the time of its ratification,
would be adapted to future circumstances; but rather than mean that it should
be open-ended and therefore adjustable by later judges, they meant that it should
be drafted in a way that would not restrict the government in ways that would
require later generations to bend, break, or even much amend it. Philip A.
Hamburger, The Constitution’s Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 239 (1989); Philip Hamburger, The Permanent Constitution, in
SESQUICENTENNIAL ESSAYS OF THE FACULTY OF COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL, 123, 12326 (2008).
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with the needs of government.105 Once rights were
enumerated, however, they were to bar federal power. As
already seen, some rights (such as those on habeas and the
quartering of soldiers) expressly allowed federal power to
prevail in specified circumstances. Otherwise, however, it
was characteristic of enumerated rights that they stood as
bulwarks against power. This was the very point of having
such rights.
It therefore is a profound change that nowadays a claim
of an enumerated right does not simply defeat a claim of
power, but instead lays the foundation for a discussion of
about the degree of the government’s interest. Rights thus no
longer conclude constitutional analysis, but rather merely
frame an ensuing conversion about interests and power.
V. PRACTICAL BENEFITS
Before turning to the inversion’s costs, this Article must
consider its most significant possible benefit—that it often
may be necessary, or at least useful, for expanding the
definition of rights.106 The suggestion that the inversion is
valuable for expansive definitions of rights has some
foundation. But the necessity of the inversion is not as great
as may be assumed, and it comes at the cost of undermining
the trumping character of enumerated rights.
A. Expanded Rights and the Necessity of Restricted Access
As a theoretical matter, there generally is an inverse
relationship between the breadth of a right and the breadth
of access to it—this being the more-is-less problem. To be
precise, as the definition of a right is expanded, there
105. Such concerns were particularly evident in debates about whether the
Constitution or, later, the Bill of Rights, could guarantee the right to a jury in
civil cases. See Debates in the N.C. Ratifying Convention, in 4 THE DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, supra note 63, at 153-55; Hamburger, The Constitution’s
Accommodation of Social Change, supra note 104, at 295-97.
106. New rights often are established by expanding the definition of existing
rights, and therefore, although one might ask about the benefits of the inversion
for establishing new rights, there seems little need to add such an inquiry.
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eventually are apt to be pressures to restrict access, and as
access to a right is expanded, there eventually are apt to be
pressures to restrict the definition.107 It therefore may be
assumed that, in order to expand the definitions of rights,
judges must restrict access, and that they must do so by
inverting rights and powers—that is, by using the
compelling-government-interest test.
Certainly, there are many instances in which judges have
justified their expansive definitions of rights by explaining
that they can cut back on access with government interests.
For example, the judges in the last half of the twentieth
century frequently interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to
guarantee a right of religious exemption—that is, they
interpreted it to secure not merely a freedom under equal
laws, regardless of one’s religion, but also a freedom from
equal laws precisely on account of one’s religion. This vision
of free exercise was so individualistic and expansive that the
judges almost inevitably had to restrict access to it, and they
predictably did so with the compelling-government-interest
test.108 As put by the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner,
the judges had to inquire “whether some compelling state
interest . . . justifies the substantial infringement of
appellant’s First Amendment right.”109 A government
interest thus could “warrant a substantial infringement of
religious liberties.”110
The reality of how judges expand rights thus may seem
to confirm that judges must restrict access and that they
must do so with the notion of compelling government
interests. This use of government interests, to restrict access
to rights, has become the standard approach for dealing with
overly expansive definitions of constitutional rights, and by
now this inversion is so familiar, that it often may seem
inevitable.

107. See Philip Hamburger, More is Less, 90 VA. L. REV. 835 (2004).
108. Id. at 858.
109. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
110. Id. at 407.
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B. Not So Necessary
Notwithstanding the logic of more is less—that expanded
definitions of rights are apt, eventually, to require
restrictions on access—it does not follow that restrictions on
access in terms of government interests are always or even
regularly necessary for expanded rights. On the contrary,
such restrictions often are unnecessary for such purposes,
and it therefore cannot be assumed that there is a need for
the inversion of rights and power.
Expanded Powers More than Expanded Rights. —One
reason that the inversion is not always necessary for
expansive definitions of rights is that the conflict between
rights and government interests does not arise merely from
expansive judicial definitions of rights. In many instances, at
least at the federal level, the conflict more centrally arises
from expansive judicial views of government power.
There has been an extraordinary expansion of federal
power; indeed, the definitions of federal powers have
expanded far more than the definitions of rights. Whatever
one thinks of this, it means that one cannot simply focus on
the expansion of the definitions of the rights. On the
contrary, it suggests that conflicts between rights and
government interests arise more from expanded powers than
from expanded rights.
Carefully Defined Rights. —A second reason that the
inversion is not regularly necessary for expansive definitions
of rights is that when judges expand rights, they could be
more careful in defining the reach of the expanded rights. If
judges took care to define rights expansively, but in a manner
that did not conflict with compelling government interests,
they would have little need to resort to such interests to cut
back on access.
Currently, the inversion of rights and power leaves
judges free to take the most expansive possible
understanding of a right. Rather than feel obliged to define
rights in ways that would avoid conflicts with compelling
government interests, judges rely on such interests to
demarcate the limits of rights, and they therefore often treat

2015]

INVERSION OF RIGHTS AND POWER

787

rights as open-ended interests. Justice O’Connor, for
example, in Employment Division v. Smith, declared:
the essence of a free exercise claim is relief from a burden imposed
by government on religious practices or beliefs, whether the burden
is imposed directly through laws that prohibit or compel specific
religious practices, or indirectly through laws that, in effect, make
abandonment of one’s own religion or conformity to the religious
beliefs of others the price of an equal place in the civil community. 111

She could take so expansive and amorphous a view of the
right because she knew she could rely on the compellinggovernment-interest test to define its practical application.
Judges, however, could avoid this inversion of rights and
power by taking the time to define the expanded right in a
way that does not collide with compelling government
interests. For example, rather than assert a generic freedom
from equal laws on account of one’s religion—a definition
that clearly is overstated—the judges could specify a
religious freedom from particular types of laws.
Of course, it sometimes would be difficult for judges to
define rights in moderate terms that are both broad and
consistent with essential government interests. But the
problem is that the judges do not even try to do this. By way
of excuse, one might conclude the judges are responding to
their general conception of rights as individual interests,
which ultimately are boundless and which thus almost
inevitably conflict with government interests. One also,
however, must wonder about the intellectual laziness of the
judges, who do not even make an effort to define rights in
ways that would render them compatible with compelling
government interests.
One way or another, the judges need to put more effort
into defining rights, and until they do so, the evidence cannot
be read as indicating that the inversion is necessary for any
current version of expansively defined rights. Although the
inversion can enable expanded definitions, what is more
apparent is that it enables the judges to be lazy. Perhaps
some rights are not susceptible to definition, but it is difficult
to reach this conclusion while the judges take an expansive
111. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 897 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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vision of government powers and often do try to define rights
in a manner consistent with government interests.
Case Law. —The suggestion that the inversion is
necessary for expansive definitions of rights becomes
especially problematic when one examines the case law.
Revealingly, the Supreme Court does not apply its inverting
doctrines only where it takes an expansive view of rights.
For example, as has been seen of the free exercise of
religion (in Part III.A), the Court applies its compellinggovernment-interest test even where it takes a decidedly
non-expansive view of the right—something that will become
further apparent (in Part VI.B) from Lukumi. Similarly, as
evident from Atlas (in Part II.D), the Court applies the public
rights doctrine to defeat the right to a civil jury, even though
the Court has reduced juries from twelve to six persons.112
Thus, in some notable instances, the Court uses its inverting
doctrines to cut back on rights at the same time that it
imposes confined definitions of the rights.
Clearly, the justification for the inversion that it allows
the expansion of rights is not regularly reflected in the case
law. On the contrary, the inverting doctrines often allow the
Supreme Court to double down on rights, such that even
where it takes a confined view of their definition—indeed,
even where it reduces their definition—it also can reduce
access.
Calculation of Gains and Losses. —Of course, none of this
is to deny the point made earlier that expansive definitions
of rights can sometimes require an inversion of rights and
power. But if this is true only in some instances, there is no
need for judges who seek expansive rights to apply the
inverting doctrines in all instances. The question, therefore,
is not whether the inversion generally is beneficial in
allowing expansive definitions of enumerated rights but
rather whether it is beneficial in allowing expansive

112. For the point about six persons, see Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 160
(1973) (holding that the Seventh Amendment does not require a jury of more than
six persons).
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definitions of some rights, even though it puts all enumerated
rights at risk.
Perhaps the benefit is worth the cost. But this cannot be
simply assumed without considering the evidence. Moreover,
where the expansion of rights comes at the cost of depriving
enumerated rights of their trumping character and thus of
their very character as enumerated rights, it becomes all the
more necessary to consider not only the alleged benefit but
also the practical costs.
VI. PRACTICAL COSTS
The inversion of rights and powers has substantial
practical costs. The doctrines that invert rights and power
allow power to trump rights, and thereby legitimize, even
practically invite, serious infringements of constitutional
rights—not just infringements at the periphery of such rights
but at their very core.
Of course, proof of causation always is difficult, and it
therefore is unrealistic to expect proof that the inversion, in
a strong sense, causes any particular deprivation of rights.
And how substantial the loss of freedom will be over the long
haul depends on evidence that is not yet available.
Nonetheless, some salient examples show that the losses
already are substantial.
Along the way, it will become apparent that the danger
from the inverting doctrines are pervasive—that far from
being confined to emergencies, they are evident even in
apparently normal times. The work of Vincent Blasi suggests
that, on account of the danger to speech in “pathological”
eras, speech doctrines should be framed for “the worst of
times,” and this Article concurs with the implications for how
rights should be formulated.113 At the same time, the evidence
here will call into question the assumption that the danger
primarily concerns speech rights and that it arises mainly in
pathological or other special circumstances. The last point
requires particular attention. Although the danger is bad in
emergencies, it can be just as bad in regular times, and this
is profoundly important, for it suggests the risk of assuming
113. Blasi, supra note 9, at 450-51.
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that the danger comes merely from other people and other
times.
That the danger comes even in ordinary times—not only
from the pressure of emergencies but also from the mundane
demands of the demos—should not be a surprise. Even in the
best of circumstances, rights are vulnerable to majority
sentiment. Nowadays, however, the inversion alters the very
nature of rights, making them subject to popular power. It
justifies the triumph of majority power over minority rights,
and it thus invites judges to uphold the very power that
rights were designed to limit.
A. Emergencies: National Security
The inversion of rights and powers is most clearly
dangerous in emergencies. A sharp emergency can make a
government interest seem especially pressing. In such
circumstances, therefore, the compelling-governmentinterest test opens up a path for harsh infringements of
rights—infringements that are apt to be regretted only after
the sense of emergency passes.
Theory of Emergency Power. —The theory that
government can violate rights and otherwise depart from law
in an emergency echoes the old absolutist idea of necessity.
And as with the old doctrine of necessity, so in the new
doctrine of compelling government interests, the exigency of
emergency circumstances sharpens the implications for
rights.
It has been seen that in the absolutist theory of power,
necessitous or compelling government interests rose above
claims of law and legal rights. As also noted, however,
American constitutions, including the U.S. Constitution,
carefully precluded such claims of state necessity, including
claims of an emergency power above the law.114
Even in emergencies, the Constitution barred emergency
power above the law. For example, when the Constitution
guaranteed habeas corpus, it allowed the federal government
to detain individuals without habeas corpus in emergencies,
114. See supra note 67.
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but only in cases of rebellion or invasion, only with an act of
Congress suspending the writ, and only under the authority
of the Constitution itself.115 Rather than a power above the
law, this emergency power to detain was one permitted and
limited by law.116 Similarly, when the Constitution protected
Americans against having soldiers quartered in their houses
without their consent, it provided that the government could
quarter soldiers only in time of war and only in a manner
prescribed by law.117 Again, although the Constitution
recognized the need for emergency power, it provided for this
power to be exercised through and under law, and it thereby
carefully avoided any recognition of an emergency power
above the law or any of the rights protected by law.118
Nowadays, however, judicial doctrine opens up a path for
an undefined emergency government power to defeat
enumerated rights. To be sure, the doctrine is not framed in
terms of a “state of emergency,” “absolute power,” or other
lurid phrases. Nonetheless, it allows government interests—
most clearly, “compelling state interests”—to defeat even the
enumerated rights, and this echoes the old doctrine on state
necessity, the doctrine that allowed necessities of state to rise
above the law.
Like Continental theories of state necessity, the theory of
compelling government interests is especially forceful in
115. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
116. It has been argued by Trevor Morrison that, even under a suspension of
habeas, detentions were unlawful and eventually subject to other legal remedies.
Trevor W. Morrison, Hamdi’s Habeas Puzzle: Suspension as Authorization?,
91 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 432 (2006); Trevor W. Morrison, Suspension and the
Extrajudicial Constitution, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1533, 1543, 1545-47 (2007). The
pre-constitutional evidence for this argument, however, does not actually support
the conclusion. HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra note 15,
at 557 n.15. More generally, there is overwhelming evidence, from England and
America, that a statute authorizing detention and suspending habeas rendered
detentions lawful and without remedy. Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Political
Question?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333, 386 (2006); Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency
Power, supra note 91, at 613, 636; see also David L. Shapiro, Habeas Corpus,
Suspension, and Detention: Another View, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 59, 86-87, 89
(2006).
117. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
118. HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra note 15, at 423-26.
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emergencies, for the more exigent the circumstances, the
more necessitous or compelling the government interest.
Thus, by means of the compelling-government-interest test,
the government acquires an emergency power to deny rights
notwithstanding the Constitution.
Korematsu and Hamdi. —The results can be observed in
two notorious cases. Far from being exceptions, they are
exactly what one would expect in emergencies from the
inversion of rights and powers.
Korematsu v. United States arose from the exclusion (and
detention) of Japanese Americans during World War II.119
This treatment of these Americans seemed a state necessity,
and the executive carried out the discriminatory constraint
without a congressional suspension of habeas corpus.120 When
the exclusion came before the Supreme Court in 1944 in
Korematsu v. United States, the Court upheld it on the
ground that the military emergency was a “[p]ressing public
necessity”—this being (as already observed) an early way of
speaking about a compelling government interest.121
Nowadays, many commentators look back on the holding
in Korematsu as an aberration. But if rights are subject to
compelling government interests, and especially if they are
subject to the government’s wartime interests, it should
hardly be a surprise that courts will end up bowing to the
claims of the government.122
Of course, it may be said that Korematsu was an
exceptional case because it occurred in the aftermath of a
military emergency, but that is precisely the point. The
Constitution rejected the absolutist doctrine that necessity
rises above the law and thereby defeats rights. The Supreme
119. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216-17 (1944).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 216.
122. In a sense, one should not attribute the result in Korematsu to the
compelling-government-interest test because this test was not yet established as
doctrine at the time of the decision. The idea of a necessitous or compelling
government interest, however, was already familiar, and it clearly underlaid the
decision.
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Court, however, in Korematsu elevated “[p]ublic necessity”
above a constitutional right, with the nearly inevitable result
that, in an emergency, the government’s interest seemed
necessitous or compelling. The doctrine created by the judges
thus comes astonishingly close to a recognition of an
emergency power above the law, but the judges apparently
do not understand that they are walking along the edge of
this precipice.
That Korematsu is not an aberration is confirmed by
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.123 Hamdi was an American citizen who
was captured while fighting against the United States in
Afghanistan.124 Ordinarily, he would have had a right to the
full due process of law in a criminal case, including a jury
trial in an Article III court and all of the other rights of a
criminal defendant. But in the crisis atmosphere following
9-11, he was held for three years by the military, and when
his writ of habeas came before the Supreme Court, it
“weigh[ed] the opposing governmental interests against the
curtailment of liberty.”125 The Court concluded that the
government had to give Hamdi “a meaningful opportunity to
contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral
decisionmaker” but not more than this.126 As put by the
Court, “the exigencies of the circumstances may demand
that, aside from these core elements, enemy-combatant
proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon
potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing
military conflict.”127 In short, where justified by “the
exigencies of the circumstances” during an “ongoing military
conflict,” the government can hold an American citizen
without a regular criminal trial or other due process of law.128
123. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 546-47 (2004).
124. Id. at 510.
125. Id. at 531.
126. Id. at 509.
127. Id. at 533.
128. Id. During the Civil War, the United States held many Confederate soldiers
as prisoners of war without giving them trials in Article III courts, but that was
a conflict that was simultaneously a rebellion and a civil war, and the United
States therefore had reason sometimes to prosecute Confederates for treason and
sometimes to hold them simply as prisoners of war. For details, see Andrew Kent,
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The case turned on Hamdi’s demand for due process of
law, and the Court therefore did not even give him the benefit
of the compelling-government-interest test. Instead, it just
applied a “balancing” standard.129 Either way, however, the
result was predictable. Although persons subject to American
law ordinarily have a constitutional right to a speedy and
regular trial, with regular criminal due process and a jury
trial in court, the “exigencies” of war outweighed this right.
The inversion of rights and power is almost a guarantee
that, in wartime or other emergencies, rights will give way to
power. Of course, the judges do not put this in terms of the
state necessity, the sovereign’s absolute power, or other ideas
of power above the law, but the similarities are obvious
enough. In most emergencies, the government’s interests or
power are apt to seem especially “compelling,” thus defeating
constitutional rights precisely when an attachment to such
rights is most needed.
B. Ordinary Circumstances in Court: Free Exercise and
Jury Rights
Not only in emergencies but also in ordinary
circumstances, the inversion is dangerous. The consequences
can be observed in decisions on free exercise and on
administrative denials of civil jury rights.
Free Exercise: Lukumi. —In a leading free exercise case,
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, the
Supreme Court condemned a series of town ordinances that
penalized animal sacrifice.130 The ordinances focused on
“ritual” and “sacrifice” and thus, on their face, might seem to
have singled out religion for constraint.131 The Court,
however, did not agree on this. Instead, it concluded that the
ordinances, although neutral on their face, were designed to
The Constitution and the Laws of War During the Civil War, 85 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1839 (2010).
129. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 532.
130. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546-47
(1993).
131. Id. at 533-34.
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prohibit the practice of Santeria, which requires the
slaughter of chickens.132
One way or another, when the Court concluded that the
ordinances penalized a religion—on their face or in reality—
it might have stopped and simply held the ordinances
unconstitutional. Instead, the Court followed its standard
approach to rights, stating that the First Amendment right
of the Santeria church depended on whether the ordinances
were justified by a compelling government interest and were
narrowly tailored to promote it.133 Already in the district
court, the decision seemed to be a matter of determining the
“balance” between the “‘the governmental and religious
interests.’”134 Although the Supreme Court rejected the
district court’s view that the government interests were
compelling, the Court adopted the compelling-governmentinterest test to determine the constitutionality of laws that it
already had found to impose discriminatory constraints on
religion.135 The Court thus opened up the possibility that a
law singling out a particular religion for constraint or penalty
could be justified by a compelling government interest.
This is astonishing and deeply worrisome. Although the
Court rightly condemned the ordinances in Lukumi, it
suggested that discriminatory religious constraints would be
upheld where the government had a sufficiently strong
reason to single out a particular religion.136 The compellinggovernment-interest test thus opens up dangers already in
ordinary times, and it thereby lays the basis for even worse
in emergencies.
Administrative Denials of Jury Rights. —Perhaps, the
clearest illustration concerns the public rights doctrine. Even
in entirely ordinary, non-emergency circumstances, this

132. Id. at 533-34, 542.
133. Id. at 546.
134. Id. at 529 (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 723
F. Supp. 1467, 1484 (S.D. Fla. 1989)).
135. See id. at 546-47.
136. For a more detailed analysis of Lukumi, see Hamburger, More is Less,
supra note 107, at 879-81.
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doctrine defeats the right to a jury where the government
acts through administrative adjudication.
Defendants traditionally had a right to a jury in judicial
decisions, other than those in equity or admiralty, and this
meant that, with these two exceptions, government could not
issue edicts imposing constraints on persons without offering
a jury. Executive decisions about government benefits were
binding in the sense that they settled who would get benefits.
Judicial decisions, however, were binding in the deeper sense
that they were edicts that imposed legally binding
constraints, and in these cases defendants had a right to a
jury.137
Although this right was widely understood to be a
foundation of liberty, it has suffered profoundly with the
development of administrative power. In particular, when an
executive or other agency engages in binding adjudication, it
issues edicts that impose binding constraints but without a
jury. Many such administrative proceedings are criminal in
nature and therefore deny the jury guaranteed by the
Constitution in “the Trial of all Crimes” and “all criminal
prosecutions.”138 Although the Supreme Court has not
recognized the criminal nature of such proceedings, it should
be kept in mind that, if administrative proceedings are not
criminal in nature, they are civil. And this presents a
constitutional problem, for the Seventh Amendment
guarantees trial by jury “[i]n Suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars.”139
As already noted in Part II, this right to a jury was not
simply a guarantee of juries in common law (non-statutory)
actions. Indeed, it arose from demands for juries in civil
actions. Fearing attempts to evade jury trials, AntiFederalists insisted on an express guarantee of juries in civil
cases. The Seventh Amendment therefore guaranteed a jury
not merely in common law actions, but more broadly in
137. For these distinctions, see HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
UNLAWFUL?, supra note 15, at 2-4, 191. Of course, for civil cases under forty
shillings, there traditionally was no right to a jury because these cases fell below
the floor for royal jurisdiction. HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY, supra note
25, at 410.
138. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
139. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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“[s]uits at common law”—that is, in all civil cases outside of
equity and admiralty.
This was especially significant because the Constitution
vested federal judicial power in the courts and assumed only
criminal and civil jurisdiction. Initially, the Constitution
guaranteed only criminal juries, but the Seventh
Amendment added a guarantee of civil juries. This
amendment thereby completed the establishment of juries as
an enforcement filter between the government and the
people.140
Put another way, the Seventh Amendment’s right to a
jury was not simply a technicality about the courts; instead,
it completed a fundamental mechanism that required the
government, whenever it acted against members of the
public, to act through the judgment of the community, as
represented by the jury.141 Just as the king in England could

140. Alexander Hamilton wrote: “[i]t is essential to the idea of a law, that it be
attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a penalty or punishment for
disobedience,” and “[t]his penalty, whatever it may be, can only be inflicted in two
ways; by the agency of the courts and ministers of justice, or by military force; by
the coercion of the magistracy, or by the coercion of arms.” THE FEDERALIST NO.
15, at 95 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). From the other side of
the debate, “Brutus” observed that “[t]he real effect of this system of government,
will . . . be brought home to the feelings of the people, through the medium of the
judicial power.” Brutus XI, NEW YORK JOURNAL (Jan. 31, 1788), reprinted in 15(3)
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 41, at 512.
141. The breadth of the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee has tended to go
unrecognized, because of a misunderstanding about its twenty dollar floor. The
amendment guarantees trial by jury in suits at common law, “where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,” and on this basis, it is widely assumed
that the amendment truncated the common law right. In fact, the amendment
was drafted on the assumption that civil disputes for amounts below twenty
dollars could be considered below the jurisdiction of the common law and thus not
within the common law rights enjoyed in civil cases.
In English law, the floor for the civil jurisdiction of the common law courts, and
thus for the right to a jury in civil cases, had been forty shillings. In the American
colonies and early American states, legislatures attempted to lift this floor so as
to leave room for justices of the peace to hear small claims without juries.
HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY, supra note 25, at 410. Such attempts,
however, were widely condemned as unconstitutional, and after the New
Hampshire legislature raised the amount to ten pounds, the state’s Inferior
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not impose a fine or give damages on his own, so the federal
executive had no such power. Unable to act judicially on its
own to issue an edict imposing any binding constraint, the
king or executive had to go to a court and get the verdict of a
jury. The right to a jury—including the right to a jury in a
civil case—thereby precluded any executive adjudication
imposing a binding constraint.142
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Atlas Roofing recognized
this basic conflict between administrative adjudication and
the Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury.143 But rather than
uphold the right, it preserved administrative power by
concluding that, at least where the government was
enforcing statutory claims, it was exercising sovereign public
rights.144 According to the Court, these sovereign public rights
defeated the merely private constitutional right to a jury.145
As if this were not bad enough, the Court in subsequent
cases has extended this sort of argument to uphold the
administrative denial of jury rights in decisions between
Courts in 1786 held the enactment void for violating the state’s constitution. See
id. at 422-35 (describing New Hampshire’s Ten Pound Cases).
In at least one other state, however, North Carolina, the jurisdiction of justices of
the peace over debts was successfully raised to twenty pounds. 1786 N.C. Sess.
Laws, ch. 14, § 7, reprinted in 24 THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 806
(Walter Clark ed., 1905). Although some legislators protested, there appears to
have been no constitutional challenge in the courts. For the protest, see
HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY, supra note 25, at 424 n.70.
Against this background, it is a mistake to assume that the Seventh Amendment’s
twenty dollar requirement simply denied the common law right to a jury when
cases did not go above that amount. Instead, the requirement was understood to
represent the floor for common law jurisdiction and thus the floor for the common
law right to a jury in civil cases.
142. Of course, the executive was thereby limited only in imposing binding
constraints, not in distributing benefits (unless they had vested and thereby
became legal rights), and only in imposing such constraints on subjects—on
persons subject to the law of the United States—not in making demands of nonsubjects. See HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra note 15, at
228.
143. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430
U.S. 442, 449-50 (1977).
144. Id. at 450.
145. See id.
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private parties, in which the government’s public right is
nothing more than the executive’s claim of power to
adjudicate in place of the courts. The Court in Granfinanciera
v. Nordberg, for example, “rejected the view that a matter of
public rights must at a minimum arise between the
government and others.”146 On the contrary, public rights now
include not only the government’s sovereign claims against
private parties but also its sovereign claim to adjudicate
between private parties—at least where the government by
statute has created a private right that is “so closely
integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter
appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement
by the Article III judiciary.”147 Whatever this means, it
generally allows the sovereign claims of public rights to
defeat Seventh Amendment jury rights—at least where the
executive usurps the judicial power. There would be no point
in violating the Constitution’s placement of the judicial
power in the courts if the executive could not also repudiate
the right to a jury, and the Court explains this by saying that
the government’s “sovereign capacity” and “public rights”
trump private claims to a constitutional right.148
Thus, even in ordinary circumstances, the inversion has
consequences. These are hinted at in a leading free exercise
case, and are widely felt in the administrative denial of jury
rights.
C. Ordinary Circumstances Out of Court: Free Speech
What is dangerous in ordinary times in court can be
especially bad out of court—as can be illustrated by the
freedom of speech. The inversion of rights and powers has
justified the imposition of a sweeping federal system of
licensing academic speech and publication, and part of the
justification has been the theory that the government has a

146. Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54 (1989) (quoting N. Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 (1982)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
147. Id. at 69 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric.
Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 593-94 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
148. Atlas Roofing Co., 430 U.S. at 450.
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compelling government interest in protecting humansubjects.
Of course, lawyers tend to measure the effect of law by
looking at cases. Law, however, obviously affects the world in
ways that never reach the courts, and far from being merely
an additional way of understanding the consequences, this
becomes a central conceptual point when the law has the
effect of discouraging Americans from asserting and
defending their constitutional rights.
Out of Court. —Americans fortunately enjoy most of their
liberty outside of court—that is, without having to go to
court—but they can enjoy this blessing only to the extent that
their rights are clear enough not to require judicial
vindication. The function of the enumerated rights, therefore,
cannot be understood merely in terms of what they allow
courts to do in defending liberty. No less significantly, such
rights preserve liberty by clarifying for the people what they
may confidently assert as their liberty.
Madison already recognized that a bill of rights would be
valuable for establishing rights not merely in court, but more
substantially in the minds of the people. He understood that
a bill of rights would be a foundation for judicial decisions
securing liberty.149 He recognized, however, that in a republic,
where the “political” and “physical” powers of the community
were vested “in the same hands, that is in a majority of the
people,” the “tyrannical will of the sovereign” could not be
“controlled by the dread of an appeal to any other force within
the community.”150 He therefore made the profound
observation that the primary function of a bill of rights,
would be to establish maxims that would be internalized by
the people: “The political truths declared in that solemn
manner acquire by degrees the character of fundamental
maxims of free government, and as they become incorporated
149. Speech of James Madison, in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 43,
at 83 (“If [rights] are incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals of
justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those
rights . . . .”).
150. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 102, at 295, 298.
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with the national sentiment, counteract the impulses of
interest and passion.”151
This role of enumerated rights in preserving liberty out
of court had implications for the framing of such rights, and
it still has implications for judicial interpretation. To become
maxims that became incorporated with the national
sentiment, they had to be stated relatively generally.
Moreover, if they were to be foundations for liberty out of
court, they could not depend on the vagaries of getting a court
to weigh competing interests. Above all, if rights were to
become national sentiments and were to be enjoyed out of
court, they had to be clear to the people, and this meant that
they had to clearly trump government power.
By inverting rights and power—by subjecting rights to
compelling government interests—the courts render all
claims of rights uncertain. Of course, all questions of law are
uncertain at their edges, but by inverting rights and power,
the courts systematically render enumerated rights
uncertain even at their core. The courts thereby give the
government confidence that it can interfere with rights,
while they also deprive the people of their confidence that
they have any clear, strong claim against their government.
Instead, they inculcate the enervating ideas that the people’s
rights are uncertain until they go to court and, indeed, that
all rights are subject to power and thus must be evaluated
with a sort of deference to power. The effect is to deprive the
people of the very idea that they have constitutional rights in
the traditional sense—rights that trump power.
In such ways, the courts undermine the confidence and
ability of individuals to assert their rights both out of court
and in court. Out of court, individuals cannot assert a right
with confidence that it will not be defeated by power. Nor can
they rely on the government to respect their rights, for what
once were “fundamental maxims . . . incorporated with the
national sentiment” are now merely occasions for the
government to assert its trumping interests.152 Moreover,
individuals cannot easily seek remedies in court. Because
they lack the confidence that they can prevail, they often
151. Id. at 298-99.
152. Id.
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hesitate to spend the money and energy necessary to pursue
litigation; and because potential allies are apt to share their
lack of confidence, they have difficulty getting their support.
Thus, the lack of confidence out of court bleeds over into a
lack of confidence in going to court.
IRB Licensing. —The results can be observed in the
restoration of the licensing of speech and the press. Such
licensing was last imposed systematically in the seventeenth
century—notably by the Inquisition and the Star Chamber.
Although the extent of the First Amendment’s speech and
press rights is open to dispute, there is nothing these rights
more clearly forbade than the licensing of words.
Nonetheless, this seventeenth century danger is back, once
again threatening the very core of the freedom of speech and
the press, and much of the responsibility lies with the
Supreme Court.
The licensing works through universities and other
research institutions. The Star Chamber already used the
universities to license the publications of their personnel, and
similarly the federal government uses universities to license
human-subjects research and its publication by their
personnel.153 Nor is this a coincidence, for in a free society,
government cannot successfully license speech and
publication unless it obtains the cooperation of intermediate
institutions.
The universities are required to carry out the licensing
by establishing Institutional Review Boards.154 Under federal
regulations, these “IRBs” license “research involving human
subjects.”155 Although this sounds like conduct, the
regulations directly require IRBs to license speech in
research and in the publication of research. 156 Not
153. Philip Hamburger, IRB Licensing, in WHO’S AFRAID OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
153, 153 (Akeel Bilgrami & Jonathan R. Cole eds., 2015).
154. Id.
155. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2014).
156. The federal regulations already make this clear when they define “human
subjects” in terms of persons about whom one acquires “[d]ata” in certain ways or
specified “information.” 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f) (2014). The regulations further
reveal the focus on speech and publication when they apply the licensing only to
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surprisingly, therefore, IRBs mostly restrict not what
researchers can do, but what they can say in conducting their
research and what they can publish about it.157
The federal government gets the universities to impose
this licensing in part by making the establishment of IRBs a
condition of federal research grants, and it therefore may be
thought that the primary force behind this licensing consists
merely of lawful conditions. The government, however, uses
its grants for some research to secure licensing of all humansubjects research, regardless of its funding, and because this
is so disproportionate and non-germane, it goes beyond what
is permissible under the Supreme Court’s doctrine on
unconstitutional conditions. The imposition of the licensing
through conditions has therefore never been a sufficient
justification for the IRB licensing of speech and the press.
Indeed, already at the inception of the IRB regulations, the
government and its advisors recognized the conflict with the
First Amendment, and they therefore emphasized that the
licensing could be justified by government interests.
Sadly, it was the Supreme Court that gave the
government such confidence that its interests trumped the
First Amendment freedom from licensing. The Court had
repeatedly stated that all rights, including the freedom of
speech, were subject to compelling government interests. It
therefore should be no surprise that when the federal
government in the 1970s and 1980s imposed licensing of
human-subjects research, it felt it could do so by licensing
speech and the press and that it justified itself on grounds of
attempts to develop “generalizable knowledge”—that is, attempts to develop
theories, which (in the scientific vision) are what need to be published. 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.102(d) (2014). The licensing regulations thus focus on speech more than
legally cognizable harms.
157. As in the earlier tradition of necessity or reason of state, so in cases of
compelling government interest, the courts defer to the government’s judgment
about the necessity, reason, or interest, without considering whether it is
supported by empirical evidence. This is particularly tragic in the case of IRBs,
for there is no scientifically serious empirical evidence that inquiry, publication,
or anything else done in academic research is more dangerous than when it is
done in other spheres of life. In contrast, the IRB licensing clearly suppresses
knowledge in ways that cost thousands, perhaps even tens of thousands of lives,
every year. Hamburger, IRB Licensing, supra note 153, at 180-82.
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compelling government interests. For example, a consultant
to the government defended the licensing by reciting that
“the First Amendment is not an absolute bar to prior
restraint.”158 Similarly, a key government commission
reported that the government could regulate research
methods “in order to protect interests in health, order and
safety.”159 On such reasoning, the government was
emboldened to do what it otherwise would never have
attempted.160
Even worse, those who opposed the licensing came to
accept the mantra that free speech was subject to compelling
government interests, and they therefore largely accepted
that they lacked a clear right against the licensing. This can
be observed in the protests by a distinguished political
theorist, Ithiel de Sola Pool. He declared in 1980 that IRB
licensing would be “a more fundamental attack” than
McCarthyism, because it would “institutionalize a system of
censorship over what is at the very heart of free speech,
namely, inquiry into political, economic, and social matters—
which has always been precisely the thing that people could
do at will, without asking anyone.”161
The regulators, however, confronted Pool with the
Supreme Court’s doctrine that the freedom of speech is not
absolute. Pool therefore felt obliged to retreat to the
“balancing” approach and unfortunately conceded: “we all
158. ROBERT LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 359 (Yale
Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1988) (1986) (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 725 (Foundation Press 1978)).
159. NAT’L COMM’N PROT. HUMAN SUBJECTS BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, DHEW, (OS) 78-0008, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: INSTITUTIONAL
REVIEW BOARDS 79 (1978).
160. Incidentally, federal licensing of speech and the press has come back not
merely in the regulation of human-subjects research but also in other regulations,
such as the licensing of medical information under the HIPAA Privacy Rule, FDA
licensing of labeling, FCC licensing of radio and television on the basis of what is
said, and IRS determinations about the tax status of churches, schools, and
charities on the basis of their political speech.
161. Ithiel de Sola Pool, Remarks at the President’s Commission for the Study
of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research
Meeting 243 (July 12, 1980) (on file at Georgetown University, Box 37, Special
Collections, National Reference Center for Bioethics Literature).
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understand that freedom of speech is not absolute.”162 The
advocates of the licensing then triumphantly told him that
the Court’s doctrine “require[d] an argument as to why the
impermissible impact on speech . . . is not justified by
legitimate state interests.”163 The compelling-governmentinterest doctrine thus seemed to justify the licensing, and for
decades after Pool’s defeat, no academic (let alone any
academic institution) challenged its constitutionality—either
out of court or in court.164
The enervating effect of judicial doctrine has been
particularly severe for academics because they lack political
strength. When asserting rights in broad political
movements, Americans often enjoy the confidence that comes
with political popularity. Those such as Pool and other
academics, who must assert their rights merely as
individuals or as weak minorities, are not so fortunate. They
can muster the strength and resources to resist invasions of
their rights only if they have confidence in their claims, and
judicial doctrine has systematically deprived them of this.165
The result has been a disaster. By emboldening the
government and debilitating the people—in particular, by
depriving Americans of the confidence in liberty, that is one
of the primary benefits of having a bill of rights—the
inversion has left academics subject to the most widespread
and systematic abridgment of the freedom of speech and the
press in the nation’s history.166
162. Letter from Ithiel de Sola Pool to Morris Abrams & Alexander Capron (July
29, 1980) (on file at Georgetown University, President’s Commission for the Study
of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Box 3,
Special Collections, National Reference Center for Bioethics Literature).
163. Letter from Alexander M. Capron to Ithiel de Sola Pool (Aug. 13, 1980) (on
file at Georgetown University, President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Box 3, Special
Collections, National Reference Center for Bioethics Literature). For more on the
debilitating effects of the doctrine, see Philip Hamburger, The New Censorship:
Institutional Review Boards, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 351-54 (2005).
164. See id.
165. Id.
166. McCarthyism was more political but much less widespread, systematic,
and enduring. The abridgment of the political speech of churches, schools, and
charities under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) is also more political, and it is widespread and
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Minority Rights Subject to Majority Opinion. —One of
the reasons the compelling-government-interest test has had
such devastating effects is that what seems compelling tends
to reflect prevailing sentiment. Sometimes this actually is
majority sentiment, and sometimes it is merely what is
expected to become majority sentiment, but either way, the
compelling-government-interest test has rendered minority
opinions vulnerable to majoritarian visions of power.
IRB licensing again is a revealing example. For nearly
half a century, unsubstantiated popular or at least populist
fears about the risks to human subjects have sustained the
suppression of speech under the human-subjects research
regulations.
Although fears for human subjects seem to justify the
impingement on speech, such concerns are largely
unjustified. To be sure, there are occasional tragedies in new
drug and device trials done under the Food and Drug
Administrative regulations, but these harms are irrelevant
for understanding the risks from the non-FDA research done
under the more general human-subjects research
regulations. Once one puts aside the FDA studies, it becomes
clear that, on the whole, even in medical research, there is no
scientifically serious empirical evidence that human-subjects
research in general is harmful.167 Instead, what appears to be
distinctively risky is a specific type of research—that done by
government medical personnel on human subjects, especially
on wards of government. Beyond this, however, the fears
about human-subjects research are unsubstantiated.168
In fact, the fears for human subjects appear to reflect
popular anxieties about science, modernity, and academics.
enduring, but it is not as vigorously enforced and it has not been as lethal in its
effects. For the thousands, even tens of thousands of deaths, caused by the
suppression of medical research and its publication under the human-subjects
research regulations, see Hamburger, IRB Licensing, supra note 153, at 181-82.
167. To be precise, there is no scientifically serious empirical evidence that
anything is more dangerous when done in academic research than when outside
research is done.
168. Indeed, the article typically cited to show the danger (published by Henry
Beecher in 1966) leaves this impression only because it suppresses relevant data.
See Philip Hamburger, Getting Permission, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 405, 455-56 (2007).
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That is, they reflect majoritarian anxieties about a
distinctively modern activity engaged in by an unpopular
minority—indeed,
an
intellectual
elite.169
The
disproportionate anxieties are evident from the tendency of
commentators to compare American researchers with
ghoulish Nazis scientists. Commentators (including
government commentators) regularly justify IRB licensing by
recounting the crimes perpetrated in Auschwitz by Josef
Mengele and his associates.170 The ludicrous and offensive
character of such comparisons hints at the distorted and
“pathological” character of the fears that have upheld
constitutional licensing for nearly half a century. IRB
licensing thus illustrates how much the compelling169. As put by one observer, some of the “intense inquiry” about harm to human
subjects was “conducted by individuals whose concern for subjects seems a
surrogate for worries about unrelated problems of modern society.” E. L. Pattullo,
Institutional Review Boards and Social Research, in NIH READINGS ON THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS IN BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
10, 14 (Joan E. Sieber ed., 1984).
170. Almost all accounts of the need for IRBs begin with the experiments in Nazi
concentration camps, and this is true not only of popular studies but also of
supposedly sober academic accounts. Nuremberg, for example, is the opening
example in the Belmont Report. Already in its fourth sentence—the Belmont
Report states: “[d]uring the Nuremberg War Crime Trials, the Nuremberg Code
was drafted as a set of standards for judging physicians and scientists who had
conducted biomedical experiments on concentration camp prisoners.” Belmont
Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for Research Involving Human
Subjects, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192, 23,192 (Apr. 18, 1979). Later, when discussing the
historical foundation for understanding research on human subjects, the report
works from the example of “the exploitation of unwilling prisoners as research
subjects in Nazi concentration camps.” Id. at 23,194.
Commentators even compare Stanley Milgram—one of the most profound and
serious of twentieth century psychological researchers—with Mengele. This
lumping together of Milgram with Mengele and his colleagues can be observed,
for example, in the government education film, EVOLVING CONCERN: PROTECTION
FOR HUMAN SUBJECTS (National Library of Medicine 1986). As Richard O’Brien
observes, this “opens with a collage of four pictures showing (1) Nazi medical
researchers at Nuremberg, (2) the Tuskegee Study, (3) the Wichita Jury Study,
and (4) Stanley Milgram’s (1974) obedience research.” Richard M. O’Brien, The
Institutional Review Board Problem: Where It Came From and What to Do About
It, 15 J. SOCIAL DISTRESS & HOMELESS 23, 33 (2006). O’Brien comments: “While
there is some disagreement on the ethics of Milgram’s experiment, would anyone
group his work with that of the physicians at Tuskegee or the Nazis tried at
Nuremberg?” Id.
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D. Normal People in Normal Times
According to the work of Vincent Blasi, speech doctrine
needs to be framed in anticipation of what he calls
“pathological times.”171 This is an important insight, and the
evidence that has been examined here goes even further. It
shows that not only speech rights, but all rights are at risk,
and that the danger arises not merely during emergencies
and other special times, but at all times. Put concretely, the
inverting doctrines (ranging from the compellinggovernment-interest test to the public rights doctrine)
endanger all sorts of rights at all times, including normal
times.
The reason that the inverting doctrines are dangerous at
all times is that they create supposedly lawful pathways for
majority opinion to cut short the enjoyment of rights by
minorities. Of course, majority power can sometimes defeat
rights without the legitimacy of law, but when sanctified by
constitutional doctrine, majority power can triumph over
rights with self-righteous ease.
Pathological or Normal? —It is important to recognize
that the inverting doctrines are dangerous even in normal
times. The application of the public rights doctrine to curtail
the right to a jury, and the application of the compellinggovernment-interest test to speech, reveal that the danger is
as great in ordinary times as in emergencies. And this should
be no surprise, for the primary danger in a republic is the
power of majorities, regardless of an emergency.
The pervasiveness of the threat, even in normal times,
needs to be recognized, for only in this way will Americans
and their judges confront the threat from the inverting
doctrines. In contrast, when they can assume that the danger
comes mainly from pathologies or pathological times, they
are apt to think that the danger lies in other persons and

171. See Blasi, supra note 9, at 483, 485.
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other periods, thus allowing complacency about current
assaults on constitutional rights.
The notion of “pathology” locates the constitutional
danger in a social sickness, and it thereby allows a current
majority and its judges, who consider themselves and their
views normal, to sidestep the possibility that they and their
constitutional doctrine are profoundly dangerous. As has
been seen, however, the danger cannot be dismissed as the
product of other, sick persons and times. On the contrary, the
danger is the product of majority sentiment, both in
emergency and ordinary circumstances, and it therefore is
essential for Americans to be aware that they themselves,
even in their apparent normalcy, can be the source of the
danger. The problem lies not in a psychologically and
politically distant other, but in ourselves—even our normal
selves.
Indeed, what is normal is in some ways particularly
dangerous. In a period of a placid consensus about a danger,
there is apt to be especially widespread opinion about the
strength of the government’s interests and about the need for
its interests to trump any conflicting rights. In such
circumstances, the compelling-government-interest test can
justify broad and enduring infringements of rights—as
evident from the decades-long system of licensing speech and
publication in human-subjects research. Rather than the
product of an especially pathological period, this is the result
of apparently normal times, when there is complacent
agreement about the government’s interest.
It thus is a mistake to assume that the danger from the
compelling-government-interest test is especially great in
“pathological” times. At best, one could conclude that all
times are “pathological” in their own way. It therefore is
important to put aside psychological labels and to recognize
the unfortunate normalcy of the anxieties that lead to
suppression. In all times, there are great dangers in
suggesting that government interests can trump
constitutional rights.
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has inverted rights and powers.
Whereas the Constitution enumerated rights as exceptions
to power, judicial doctrine has introduced power as an
exception to rights. In the language of contemporary
philosophy, although the Constitution enumerated its rights
as trumps, judicial doctrine has made power trumps. It is a
sobering change, and it opens up disturbing questions about
both the structure and character of constitutional liberty.
To be sure, it is a predictable mantra that rights are not
absolute, and in many ways, for many types of rights, this
may be true. The constitutional question, however, is
structural rather than metaphysical. Power is now
understood to trump enumerated constitutional rights, and
this revives dangers that such rights were meant to put to
rest.
Among the results is a change in the character of
constitutional rights. Whereas enumerated rights once
preserved spheres of freedom that largely cut off trumping
claims about social and governmental needs, nowadays
judicial doctrines on government interests deprive rights of
this effect. Rights thus no longer conclude constitutional
analysis but merely begin a conversion about the extent of
power. Rather than little realms of liberty, rights are now
often viewed as “ways to channel the kinds of reasons and
justifications” government can use to deny liberty.172
The inversion thereby profoundly compromises the
capacity of rights to limit government. Most basically, by
subordinating enumerated rights to power, it reverses the
structural relationship of rights and power. And because
government interests are apt to seem especially compelling
during emergencies, the inversion gives the government
what is nearly an emergency power above constitutional
rights. The problem, however, is not limited to emergencies,
for even in ordinary times the inversion elevates power over
rights. Indeed, it tends to elevate majoritarian or at least
popular perceptions of the need for power over minority
rights. In such ways, it systematically undermines the
172. Pildes, Why Rights are not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms,
and Constitutionalism, supra note 4, at 761; Waldron, supra note 4, at 305.
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protection for rights, even at their core. The inversion
thereby emboldens the government to think it may lawfully
violate rights; it allows the government to defeat rights in the
courts; it even undermines the confidence of the people that
they have rights that they can successfully defend, thus
additionally having profound consequences out of court.
Absolutism. —None of this should be a surprise, for
Americans drew upon absolutist ideas when they introduced
the inversion. In the absolutist tradition that developed on
the Continent, constitutional law came not from the people,
but from the State, and power thus could trump rights, even
constitutional rights. Many late nineteenth century and
early twentieth century Americans echoed the gist of this
Staatstheorie, and they thereby transformed the American
understanding of rights.
The details are left to the Appendix, but three salient
examples can be summarized. First, many Americans
assimilated a version of the old absolutist doctrine of state
necessity—the doctrine that government necessity rises
above the law and legal rights. From this point of view, the
Supreme Court in Korematsu bluntly acknowledged that
“[p]ressing public necessity” defeated constitutional rights,
and although the Court thereafter avoided speaking in terms
of “necessity,” it persisted in allowing compelling state
interests to defeat claims of rights.173
Second, the Supreme Court adopted the civilian term
“public rights,” including its absolutist implications. Rather
than accept that government power is subject to
constitutional rights, the Court came to assume that
government has sovereign “public rights” that defeat merely
private constitutional rights, and this became the
justification for denying jury rights in administrative
adjudication.174
Third, and most broadly, many Americans absorbed the
absolutist assumption that the State is the source of rights
173. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
174. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430
U.S. 442, 450 (1977).
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and thus can realign them in accord with its understanding
of societal needs. Many turn-of-the-century Americans
repeatedly espoused this view, and they thereby reinforced
the conclusion that government has the power to adjust even
constitutional rights.175
In such ways, although enumerated constitutional rights
once were structurally absolute, now government power is
structurally absolute. The lesson seems to be that at least
constitutional law, and the rights protected and enumerated
by it, must be absolute so that power does not become
absolute.
Lazy Judging. —The problem can be understood as one
of intellectual laziness. Where claims of enumerated rights
seem to conflict with government claims, judges analyze the
rights in terms of conflicting interests, and they thereby
leave the definitions of rights so open-ended that the judges
almost inevitably feel the need to confine the rights by
looking to government interests. Government interests thus
become a lazy substitute for careful definitions of rights.
Regardless of whether judges define enumerated rights
narrowly, expansively, or somewhere in the middle, they
should at least try to define them in a way that is not so openended as to invite the use of government interests to trump
the rights. This means defining rights doctrinally, not in
terms of power or government interests or functions. It also
means choosing doctrinal definitions carefully, so that they
have a good chance of standing the test of time, across
varying circumstances, without having to be trumped by
power. None of this precludes judges from expanding rights
or establishing new ones, but it does require judges to do so
thoughtfully. Whatever judges do with rights, they should
not define them in ways that invite inversion and thereby
undermine the character and effectiveness of enumerated
rights as limits on power.
The Role of the Supreme Court. —If at any time in the
twentieth century the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court had
175. This perspective overlapped with, and was closely allied with, the legal
realist view of rights, but that is a story for another time.
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declared that they were restructuring rights and power so as
to invert their relationship, there would have been protests.
So candid and bold a subversion of liberty surely would have
provoked widespread and probably successful opposition.
Like other judicial modifications of law, however, the
restructuring of rights was never formally declared, at least
not in such terms, and it therefore became a part of judicial
doctrine without a public decision, without public debate, and
most fundamentally without even being recognized for what
it was.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court recently acknowledged
the possibility that there be some core of the freedom of
speech that stands beyond any government interests.176 The
Court, however, refrained from endorsing this conclusion,
because so broad a holding was unnecessary for its decision.
Although such restraint would be commendable if the
Court were discussing a question at the outer edges of the
law, it is another matter when the Court refuses to state a
basic constitutional principle about the relationship of rights
to power. It is especially problematic where the Court bears
much responsibility. The Court long ago went far beyond
what was necessary for deciding its cases when it sweepingly
generalized that no right is absolute and that all rights are
subject to compelling government interests or other
balancing. These doctrines inverted the relationship between
rights and power and ever since have practically invited the
government to abuse its power. Therefore, quite apart from
the ordinary obligation of judges to state foundational
principles of law accurately, the justices of the Supreme
Court have a special obligation to do so here. Having stood
rights on their head, they need to set matters right.
Although it is late in the day, it should never be too late
to restore constitutional liberty. The restructuring of rights
and power has already seriously abridged key constitutional
rights, including freedom of speech, jury rights, and the
freedom from detention without trial, and these losses
provide a grave warning about the losses yet to come if the
inversion is not recognized and repudiated.
176. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010). For further discussion,
see supra note 2.
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APPENDIX
THE ABSOLUTIST ORIGINS OF THE INVERSION OF RIGHTS AND
POWER
The inversion of rights and power has a history in
absolutist ideas. The elevation of government power over
rights is apt to be defended as a pragmatic American
response to the pressures of modern industrial life, or as a
realist rejection of metaphysical conceptions of rights. What
always, however, is omitted from such accounts is that the
Americans who introduced the inversion into American law
drew, directly or indirectly, upon Continental and especially
German Staatstheorie—a theory of government and law that
carried forward old absolutist assumptions about the State’s
authority over the people and individuals. Absolute power
thus became a key foundation for the inversion and its
rejection of structurally absolute rights.
Of course, this history may seem long past, and in any
case absolutist ideas were not the only foundation for the
inversion. Nonetheless, such ideas remain important in
suggesting the nature of the inversion and its danger. The
inversion gave effect in America to earlier Continental ideas
of absolute power—in particular Continental ideas about
how State power can trump even enumerated constitutional
rights—and once this is understood, it is difficult to avoid
being self-conscious about the danger.
A. Staatstheorie in America
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, American scholars, lawyers, and politicians drank
deeply from German theory. Of particular interest here, they
imbibed much of the German political and legal theory of the
State, in which the State had a generic power over society,
including personal rights.177
These ideas of power had developed in the Middle Ages
largely among scholars of the civil law, but by the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, they no longer were confined to
177. Staatstheorie is understood broadly here to include its manifestation not
only in political theory but also in legal and administrative scholarship.
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civilian scholarship. German academics were particularly
systematic in developing such ideas in legal and political
theory, and on this foundation many Americans, mostly
progressives, built their own vision of power over rights.
Pre-constitutional ideas of absolute power thus circled
back to Anglo-American law through Germany. Although, in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Anglo-American
constitutional law had defeated absolutist ideas about a
sovereign or State power over rights, absolutist ideas
survived on the Continent, especially in Germany, and from
there, beginning in the late nineteenth century, they
returned to common law lands.178
Staatstheorie. —German academics were the most
prolific and distinguished expositors of the civilian tradition
of the State. The common law, since at least the time of
Bracton, had generally embraced the ideal that the law
established rulers and limited what they could do.179 The civil
law, however, had assumed that rulers established law and
that they therefore could adjust the rights enjoyed under it—
indeed, that they sometimes could deny such rights.180 During
the Middle Ages, civilian scholars had attributed this sort of
absolute power to kings or princes, but around the time of the
Reformation, civilian-trained scholars increasingly located
this power in the State.
Of course, when the personal power of kings became the
depersonalized power of the State, much changed. For
example, the prerogative will of the ruler exercised outside
178. DENNIS J. MAHONEY, POLITICS AND PROGRESS: THE EMERGENCE OF
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE 30 (2004); Sylvia D. Fries, Staatstheorie and the
New American Science of Politics, 34 J. HIST. IDEAS 391, 403-04 (1973).
179. The English judge Bracton emphasized that what a king forbade to others,
“he ought not to do himself.” BRACTON, supra note 23, at 305. The king was thus
to “temper his power by law, which is the bridle of power, that he may live
according to the laws”—to which Bracton suggestively added: “for the law of
mankind has decreed that his own laws bind the lawgiver.” Id.
180. The civilian analysis harkened back to the view, recorded by Justinian,
that “[w]hat pleases the prince has the force of law.” The maxim was from
Ulpian’s version of the Lex Regia, recited in DIG. 1.4.1.pr (Ulpian, Institutes 1);
J. INST. 1.2.6 (“quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem.”).
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the legislature became the administrative rulemaking
exercised outside the legislature. All the same, there was
much continuity. The Continental scholars who upheld the
State as the ultimate authority in society, and especially the
German scholars who propounded this in their Staatstheorie,
became the primary conduits for perpetuation of absolutist
ideas.181
In the German vision, the State was not merely the
government, but something more enduring and ominous.
According to Anglo-American constitutional theory, the
people created the fundamental law, the constitution, and
thereby established government subject to legal limits,
including constitutional rights. In the German theory,
however, at least as it developed by the nineteenth century,
the State persisted over time, and notwithstanding changes
in the constitution or form of government, the State’s basic
interests remained unchanged.182 Most prominently, it
always enjoyed the power necessary to preserve itself and the
order, or Ordnung, of the society.183
From this perspective, the State enjoyed power
independently of what the people might say, and although
the people might purport to enact a law establishing their
government, the real constitution was what the State did or
at least what it authorized. For example, because law was
understood to embody the State’s coercive power, the State
itself was the source of all law, whether the constitution or
other law. Indeed, although the State could act through law,
it also could act against the people through other forms of
command—this extralegal command being what was called
“administrative power.”184
181. See HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra note 15, at
441-78.
182. See G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 311-12 (Allen
W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991).
183. 4 Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preussischen Staaten, 1004, tit. XVII § 10
(Berlin 1794). This section of the Prussian code famously provided: “[t]o make the
necessary provisions for preserving public peace, security, and order (Ordnung),
and for averting dangers threatening the public or individuals, is the function of
the police.” Id. as translated by ERNST FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER
PERSONS AND PROPERTY 140 n.2 (1928).
184. HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra note 15, at 1-5.
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Of course, the State (echoing earlier monarchs) justified
itself on the ground that it sought the well-being of the
people. And it attempted to substantiate this claim by
employing the educated and supposedly disinterested to
exercise its administrative power. But the key point was that
all of its authority came from above, not from below.
Americans. —In the half-century from the Civil War
until World War I, vast numbers of academic and other
Americans turned, at least to some degree, toward the
absolutist vision of the State. Many were pained by what they
considered the provincial character of America and its ideas,
and they therefore were easily awed by the “scientific” study
of law and politics in German universities. Increasing
numbers of educated Americans, moreover, felt uneasy about
the democratization of American politics, in which diverse
and uneducated masses repeatedly elected corrupt officials.
Many of the educated also felt disgust for the crass,
commercial character of American life and were disappointed
that popularly elected legislatures had failed to confine the
pursuit of commercial self-interest.
They often made explicit that their concerns about
democracy were anxieties about the demos itself. Woodrow
Wilson complained that the reformer needed to influence “the
mind, not of Americans of the older stocks only, but also of
Irishmen, of Germans, of Negroes.”185 Taking a slightly
different tack, Professor John Burgess of Columbia
generalized about the “spurious” sort of democratic
government in which “the ignorant rule the enlightened” and
“the vulgar rule the refined.”186
In these circumstances, large swaths of educated
Americans, especially progressives, lost faith in “democratic”
government and began to explore alternatives. Rather than
place their trust in the people, many shifted their hopes to a
government led by the educated, considering this to be the
185. Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 209
(1887).
186. Professor John W. Burgess, Address Made on the Invitation and at the
Request of the Newport Improvement Association (Sept. 5, 1913), in Bulletin
No. 2, Sept. 1913, at 23.
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means of establishing uncorrupt public interests above the
discordant interests of America’s fractured society.
In other words, rather than leaving the people to govern
themselves, many educated Americans, above all
progressives, hoped for a mode of government that would be
guided by persons of education, taste, and refinement—
namely, by persons like themselves. Wilson, for example,
urged that “[t]he most despotic of governments under the
control of wise statesmen is preferable to the freest ruled by
demagogues,” and he therefore sought to combat “the error of
trying to do too much by vote,” lest public opinion become
“meddlesome.”187 Documenting such attitudes, William
Nelson caustically observes: “Many reformers believed that
they themselves constituted precisely the sort of aristocracy
needed in government.”188
It therefore is not a surprise that many Americans,
beginning in the late nineteenth century, turned from
familiar ideas of power by the people to foreign ideas of power
over the people. Of course, they still said it was power of and
for the people—just not so much by them. Americans by the
thousands went to Germany to study the Staatstheorie and
its elaboration in constitutional and administrative
scholarship, and after German-inspired scholars came to
dominate parts of the American professoriate, young
Americans did not have to travel further than domestic
colleges to imbibe the theory and its reconfiguration of
American constitutional law and rights.189
One result was a tendency among American political
theorists, politicians, and eventually also lawyers, to think
187. WOODROW WILSON, CABINET GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 20 (1947);
Wilson, The Study of Administration, supra note 185, at 214-15.
188. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS
1900, at 90 (1982).
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189. MAHONEY, supra note 178, at 3, 8-9, 11, 22 (regarding German training of
American political scientists); C. EDWARD MERRIAM, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
POLITICAL THEORIES 338-39 (1903) (regarding German ideas in America); Fries,
supra note 178, at 391, 392, 394, 396 (regarding the German training of
Americans and German ideas in America); Ronald J. Pestritto, The Progressive
Origins of the Administrative State: Wilson, Goodnow, and Landis, 24 SOC. PHIL.
& POL’Y 16, 40 (2007).
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not merely about the government of the United States, with
its limited powers under the U.S. Constitution, but rather
about the State as a type of institution that persisted through
history and across the globe with relatively uniform interests
and thus almost limitless power. As Wilson explained in his
book The State, “the functions of government are still . . .
much the same both in number and magnitude that they
always were,” and, recognizing the implications, he
concluded that government’s “sphere is limited only by its
own wisdom, alike where republican and where absolutist
principles prevail.”190
This assimilation of absolutist ideas about the State had
consequences for the relationship of rights to power. After
being taught such ideas in American law schools, the judges
eventually forgot that enumerated constitutional rights were
exceptions from the enumerated federal powers and, instead,
concluded that such rights were merely interests, which were
subject to generic state or government interests.
B. State Necessity
One of the absolutist civilian ideas that was transmitted
to America through German Staatstheorie was the doctrine
of state necessity. The common law’s constitutionalist
tradition had long rejected any claim that government
necessity could rise above the law and the rights it secured
against government. In the absolutist tradition, however,
necessities of state—sometimes described as sovereign
necessities—were said to rise above the law and legal rights.
This Continental vision had broad appeal among American
progressives, who soon used it to assert government power
over enumerated rights.
It was an old adage of the learned law (the academic
study of civil and canon law) that necessity had no law, and
from this perspective, the state’s “necessities”—its
190. WOODROW WILSON, THE STATE: ELEMENTS OF HISTORICAL AND PRACTICAL
POLITICS 50 (special ed. 1918) (1911). As noted by Daniel Rodgers, Wilson taught
that rights rested on “the broad ground of convenience,” and that they were to be
adjusted in accord with “the state of opinion and the stage of social convention.”
RODGERS, supra note 86, at 159 (emphasis omitted).
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compelling interests—rose above the law, even above legally
protected rights.191 As might be expected of academic ideas of
power, such claims about necessity elevated reasoning about
the State and its needs above any legally defined sphere of
authority, whether the powers of government or the rights of
those subject to it.192 Indeed, the academic lawyers often
asserted their arguments about government necessity in
terms of “reason of state,” and this thereby became a widely
recognized name for government lawlessness.
Already in England, when seventeenth century English
kings made claims of necessity, or of reason of state,
Parliament systematically repudiated their arguments.
Many worried, in the words of one Parliamentarian, Edmund
Waller, that “[n]ecessity” had the effect of “dissolving all
law.”193 In response, it was commonly insisted that the law
was impervious to assertions of necessity. As put by John
Selden, “No matter of state can alter the law.”194 Although
Parliament rejected the king’s power of necessity only to
claim it for itself, Americans eventually rejected Parliament’s
power above the law.195 Indeed, the U.S. Constitution
systematically established all power under law, and all

191. For a fourteenth century civilian statement of the maxim, see ALBERICI DE
ROSATE, supra note 21 (“[n]ecessitas non h[ab]et lege[m].”). For the role of the
maxim in seventeenth century ideas about reason of state, see David S.
Berkowitz, Reason of State in England and the Petition of Right, 1603-1629, in
STAATSRÄSON: STUDIEN ZUR GESCHICHTE EINES POLITISCHEN BEGRIFFS 165 (Roman
Schnur ed., 1975).
192. See supra part IV.C.
193. Speech of Edmund Waller, in 3 HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS 1339 (John
Rushworth ed., 1721).
194. John Selden, Speech Before the House of Commons (Mar. 27, 1628), in 2
COMMONS DEBATES 1628, 164, 164 (Robert C. Johnson & Maija Jansson Cole eds.,
1977). Thomas Hedley earlier complained about the king’s power to impose duties
or taxes, noting “[t]his question [is] determinable only by the common law of
England, for law of State he knows not.” Thomas Hedley, Speech Before the House
of Commons (June 23-28, 1610), in PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES IN 1610, 72, 72
(Samuel Rawson Gardiner ed., 1862).
195. See supra Part I.A.
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enumerated rights free from government power, thus
burying state necessity under law.196
It may be thought that the Necessary and Proper Clause
allowed government necessity to prevail over rights, but
nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, the
Necessary and Proper Clause was designed to tame claims of
necessity by reducing them to claims through and under the
law. In his lectures at Princeton, John Witherspoon had
worried about how a claim of state necessity could be brought
within the law and had suggested a solution: “If the law
described circumstantially what might be done, it would be
no longer a right of necessity, but a legal right.”197 When the
framers, including some of Witherspoon’s students, later
wrestled with the problem in the summer of 1787, they
similarly brought necessity within the law. They allowed the
federal government to respond to necessities, but only
through laws that were enacted by Congress and that met
the Constitution’s measure of what was necessary—a
measure that required any such statute to be both necessary
and proper for carrying out one of the powers that the
Constitution vested in the government.198 Evidently, the
Necessary and Proper Clause brought necessity under law.199

196. Even where the guarantee of habeas authorized suspension and the
guarantee against quartering soldiers left an exception, the government had to
act under statute, and the remaining freedom was guaranteed free from any
trumping power. See supra Part IV.A.
Of course, as observed, supra note 13, executive officials could still depart from
law on grounds of necessity, but it was assumed that in doing so, they should
confess the unlawfulness of their conduct and should be subject to the legal
consequences unless spared by an act of indemnification. This tradition of a noble
departure from law was very different from the claim that necessity legally
justified otherwise unlawful acts.
197. Lectures on Moral Philosophy, in 3 THE WORKS
WITHERSPOON 370 (1800).
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198. To be precise, the clause authorized Congress “[t]o make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
199. HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra note 15, at 423-26;
HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY, supra note 25, at 335 n.12.
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Moreover, after authorizing Congress to respond to
necessities, the Constitution limited congressional powers
with enumerated rights—initially in the Constitution itself,
and then in the Bill of Rights. Madison himself, when
introducing the Bill of Rights, noted how it would limit the
dangers apprehended from the Necessary and Proper Clause
by restraining the power exercised under it.200 Far from rising
above rights, the power granted by the Necessary and Proper
Clause was entirely subject to the enumerated rights.
Nonetheless, the old claim of state necessity has crawled
back out of the grave—this time in the form of the
compelling-state-interest test. Although most progressives
did not themselves read German Staatstheorie, many
assimilated the spirit of arguing from social, public, or
governmental necessity.201
For example, when upholding administrative power
notwithstanding its violation of the Constitution (including
its procedural rights), American courts repeatedly relied on
the notion of necessity. As early as 1918, Professor John
Cheadle observed that “there seems to be a growing tendency
in the decisions to give prominence to the supposed ‘necessity’
of the case, even while admitting—unnecessarily, perhaps—
that this delegation appears contrary to the letter if not to
the spirit of the Constitution.”202 Even where the cases did not
admit they were responding to necessity, legal realists were
ready to conclude that this was the underlying reality—“that
acceptance by the courts of the practice of delegating rulemaking power is merely a recognition of governmental
necessities.”203 It thus became commonplace to observe that,
notwithstanding
the
constitutional
objections,
administrative powers were sustained by the courts “because
200. Speech of James Madison, in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 43,
at 82-83.
201. The political theorists, however, usually made the effort to study in
Germany or at least to learn German—Woodrow Wilson being a prominent
example.
202. John B. Cheadle, The Delegation of Legislative Functions, 27 YALE L.J. 892,
892-93 (1918).
203. JOHN B. ANDREWS, ADMINISTRATIVE LABOR LEGISLATION 170 (1936).
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of the recognition of the necessity which prompts them.” 204
Even the Supreme Court justified administrative law on the
basis of alleged necessity—for example, when it opined that
Congress’s power in relation to the other branches “must be
fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities
of the governmental co-ordination.”205
The argument from government necessity justified not
only new sorts of government power but also the exertion of
power over rights. Indeed, when the Supreme Court, in
Korematsu v. United States, first introduced what became the
compelling-government-interest test, it spoke in terms of
necessity. It explained that racially discriminatory
constraints were “immediately suspect” and thus subject to
“the most rigid scrutiny” but immediately added that
“[p]ressing public necessity may sometimes justify the
existence of such restrictions.”206 The Court thereby
resuscitated the old absolutist doctrine of public or state
necessity, and although the Court soon rephrased it in terms
of a “compelling” government interest, the implications for
rights were the same. Like state necessity, a compelling state
interest is the generic interest of the State. Like its
204. Thomas I. Parkinson, Functions of Administration in Labor Legislation, 20
AM. LAB. LEGIS. REV. 143, 149 (1930).
205. J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928). The
Court similarly observed: “Delegation by Congress has long been recognized as
necessary in order that the exertion of legislative power does not become a
futility.” Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940).
At least once, in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, the Supreme Court
cautioned against the repeated claims of necessity. Speaking about statutes that
subdelegated rulemaking power, the Court said that “the constant recognition of
the necessity and validity” of such enactments “cannot be allowed to obscure the
limitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional system is to be
maintained.” A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530
(1935). The Court acknowledged that “[e]xtraordinary conditions may call for
extraordinary remedies,” but “[e]xtraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge
constitutional power.” Id. at 528. Thus, the “powers of the national government
are limited by the constitutional grants,” and “[t]hose who act under these grants
are not at liberty to transcend the imposed limits because they believe that more
or different power is necessary.” Id. at 528-29.
206. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). But see Stephen A.
Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 48
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 355-56, 381 (2006) (arguing that the compelling-stateinterest test first developed not in equal protection decisions but in First
Amendment cases).
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predecessor, it reveals nothing about the nature of the state
interest, except that it is enough to defeat the contrary legal
claims. Like its forbear, it allows State power to prevail over
rights.
Of course, the justices in the 1940s and later did not
intend to revive the old doctrine of state necessity. Indeed, it
is doubtful how much at that late date they even understood
what they were doing. But they had imbibed much of what
progressive Americans had taught, and in this spirit they
held that “public necessity” or “compelling state interests”
trumped claims of rights.
C. Public Rights
Another illustration of how absolutist Continental ideas
became part of the American elevation of power over rights
can be observed in the notion of public rights. When the
Supreme Court initially used the phrase “public rights” in
1856 in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co., it was referring merely to the executive’s traditional
power under law and thus not to any administrative attempt
to exercise the judicial power, which the Constitution
generally places in the courts.207 The phrase, however, has
subsequently become a springboard for claims that
administrative
power,
including
administrative
adjudication, defeats the Seventh Amendment’s right to a
jury, and not surprisingly the phrase was drawn from the
absolutist traditions of the civil law.
When first encountered, the notion of the executive’s
“public rights” is disconcerting, for it is conventional to speak
of personal rights and governmental powers. To be sure,
there is no necessary difference between rights and powers,
and it is not uncommon to speak of the government’s rights
in relation to other governments. Nonetheless, in relation to

207. By the judicial power, this Article does not mean adjudication about the
distribution of government benefits, except where a legal right in them has
vested. Instead, it means adjudication of the sort that concludes with an edict
imposing a legally binding constraint. For details, see HAMBURGER, IS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra note 15, at 191-226; see also supra note
142.
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domestic persons, one ordinarily says that the government
exercises powers rather than rights.
How, then, did the Supreme Court come to speak of the
executive’s domestic “public rights”? Roman law had
distinguished between ius publicum and ius privatum, and
this could be translated as a distinction between public and
private law. The former concerned the interests of the state,
and the latter, merely private interests. Yet even when thus
understood simply as a distinction between two types of law,
the public-private distinction carried risks, for it suggested
that public and private matters were not subject to the same
law of the land, and it thereby could lend legitimacy to claims
by the government and its officers that they were not subject
to the law that applied to others. In opposition to this dual
vision of law, the common law placed the monarch under the
law of the land, the same law that governed his subjects.
Similarly, Anglo-American constitutions limited government
on the theory that they were part of the law of the land.
Rather than another sort of law, constitutions were simply
the highest part of the same law.208
Although it was not easy at common law to accept a
civilian distinction between public and private law, there was
another possibility, for ius publicum and ius privatum could
be understood as two types of rights: the public rights of
government and the private rights that ordinarily were
enjoyed by private persons. The word ius was notoriously
capable of meaning either law or right, and it therefore is
unsurprising that ius publicum came to be understood by
civilian-influenced commentators (such as William
Blackstone) to be the government’s public rights.209 Similarly,
some American lawyers found it an appealing label for the
government’s (or at least the executive’s) lawful power.
One problem was the sheer breadth of the power that
could be subsumed under the rubric of “public rights.”
Recognizing this difficulty, one American commentator
208. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
209. See LEXICON IURIDICUM: HOC EST, IURIS CIVILIS ET CANONICI IN SCHOLA
ATQUE FORO USITATARUM VOCUM PENUS 520 (n.p., 1607) (“Ius pluribus modis
dicitur, hoc est, multa significat.”); see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 32, at *118.
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attempted to flip the phrase around by speaking, instead,
about “the public rights of the people.”210 Typically, however,
the implications cut the other way. Like the Continental
notion that lingered in the background, the phrase “public
rights” (although plural) could suggest the generic power of
government in public matters, not merely enumerated
powers, let alone merely executive power.
An even greater problem with the phrase “public rights”
was the suggestion that the government did not merely have
powers derived from the people, but rather, qua government
had rights against the people. Ideas about ius publicum and
derivative notions of the government’s public rights seemed
to suggest that the government had a range of inherent
power, which could not be limited by the law or rights
established by the people.
Far from being merely historical, these dangers have
come back to life. As in the past, the notion of ius publicum,
or “public rights,” lends itself to the idea that the executive
enjoys general governmental rights that trump the legal
claims of the public. The U.S. Constitution structures rights
as exceptions to the powers of government; but when the
executive’s power is understood as a right, it becomes
plausible to invert this structural relationship—to conclude
that the government’s public rights override merely private
claims to constitutional rights.
Such is the conclusion of the Supreme Court in Atlas
Roofing. Faced with a Seventh Amendment objection to
administrative fact-finding, the Court in that case says that
the executive in its administrative proceedings is asserting
the government’s “public rights.” It then concludes that
where public rights are based on a statute, they carve out an
exception from the constitutional right to a jury. Public rights
override constitutional rights.
D. State Power Over Individual Rights
At the broadest theoretical level, the American elevation
of power over rights drew on the absolutist German idea that
all rights, even constitutional rights, were derived from the
210. WILLIAM BARTON, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST: ADDRESSED
PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 38 (1804).
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State. From this perspective, the State could adjust rights in
its ordinary exercise of its power.
Americans traditionally had assumed that government
derived from an act of the people and ultimately even from
the consent of individuals, and on this foundation, they
understood their constitutional rights to trump government
power. They increasingly learned from the Germans,
however, that the State was the source of all law and rights
and that it thus had priority over rights. Many Americans
thereby came to assume that government power trumped
individual rights and that it could reshape them to satisfy
government interests.211
German State Power. —The absolutist assumptions that
the Germans inherited from civilians elevated the State
above all other interests in society and established State
power as the measure of individual freedom. Even a scholar
as liberal as Georg Jellinek went so far as to say: “The
individual personality is not the basis but the result of the
legal community.”212 From this perspective, even when
German scholars allowed that the State could establish
administratively enforceable rights against itself, they
emphasized that the State was the source of such rights and
that it therefore could reduce or abrogate them.213
One element of this delegitimization of rights was the
notion that rights were merely selfish claims of individual
interest. Sometimes echoing Hegel, although not always in
agreement with him, many German academics distinguished
211. Writing about American political scientists, Daniel Rodgers observes: “To
a man, the new professional political scientists shuttled talk of rights—both
natural and conventional—off into their back pages, compressed it drastically, or
simply dropped it out as irrelevant to the central concern of their science.”
RODGERS, supra note 86, at 159. Although Rodgers believes that “[t]he political
scientists’ State was the logical consequence of their antirights talk,” there is
reason to think that the logic worked both ways. Id. at 161.
212. GEORG JELLINEK, SYSTEM DER SUBJEKTIVEN ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTE 29
(1905), as quoted by Jud Mathews, Administrative Law in Comparative
Perspective: Translating the German Doctrine of Subjective Public Rights 30
(May 2, 2005) (unpublished paper) (on file with author).
213. Id. at 36.
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between the at least potentially unified interests of the State
and the fragmented interests of individuals in society.214 They
thereby often denigrated claims of rights against the
government as subjective claims of individual self-interest in
opposition to the objective and moral interests of the State.215
The State’s power over rights thus seemed essential for
securing protection against the selfish and discordant
character of society—indeed, for securing the sort of liberty
that could safely be enjoyed in society.
In this vision, the power of the State rested on the
people’s unity of interest. It is not unreasonable to assume
that a people have at least some shared interest. At the same
time, however, if their shared interest, and thus the power of
the State, is taken to be so complete, unified, and objective
that all other interests are merely selfish and subjective,
there can be little room for constitutional rights. In such a
framework, any constitutional rights become matters of
individual self-interest that must be trumped whenever
there is a greater State interest.
American Progressives. —Many progressives, echoing
the German model, abandoned the constitutional vision of
rights as limits on government and instead suggested that
rights were merely selfish individual claims, which the State
was justified in restricting. As put by Frank Goodnow, an
“insistence on individual rights” could “become a menace
when social rather than individual efficiency is the necessary
prerequisite of progress.”216

214. See, e.g., Erich Hahn, Rudolf Gneist and the Prussian Rechtsstaat: 186278, 49 J. MOD. HIST. D1361, D1362, D1371 (1977); Robert D. Miewald, The Origins
of Wilson’s Thought: The German Tradition and the Organic State, in POLITICS
AND ADMINISTRATION: WOODROW WILSON AND AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
17, 19–20 (Jack Rabin & James S. Bowman eds., 1984); Mark R. Rutgers, Can the
Study of Public Administration Do Without a Concept of the State? Reflections on
the Work of Lorenz Von Stein, 26 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 395, 398-400, 402 (1994); Giles
Pope, Abstract, The Political Ideas of Lorenz Stein and Their Influence on Rudolf
Gneist and Gustav Schmoller, 4 GER. HIST. 60, 60 (1987).
215. See, e.g., JELLINEK, supra note 212, at 28, as quoted by Mathews, supra
note 212, at 30.
216. FRANK JOHNSON GOODNOW, THE AMERICAN CONCEPTION
GOVERNMENT 21 (1916).
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The Germanic vision stood in contrast to traditional
American visions of society in many ways, but most broadly
by imposing a vision of unified State power on a diverse
society. Hegel understood that America had not yet
developed in a manner that fit his vision. But when
Americans adopted his ideas and those of other Germans,
they came to understand America in terms that left little
legitimacy for the nation’s diversity. The Germanic vision, in
which State power was unified, moral, and objective, and in
which individual rights were merely diverse, subjective, and
selfish, did not recognize the ways in which diverse
individuals, associations, and groups could have their own
legitimacy in society—a legitimacy that did not depend on
State power and was not entirely subject to it. And without
this legitimacy, it is no wonder that claims of constitutional
rights seemed merely contingent upon State power.
Although progressives typically held back from extremes
and insisted that they valued individual liberty, many
adopted at least the German view of the State’s power over
rights. They argued that the State rather than the people was
the source of liberty and that individuals therefore were
subject to the State’s judgment about how far individual
rights had to give way to state interests. At Columbia, for
example, John Burgess concluded that the State “formed for
itself a constitution” and that it itself was “the source of
individual liberty.”217 Indeed, he defined sovereignty as
217. JOHN W. BURGESS, 1 POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 49, 175 (1890). Similarly, he wrote that “[l]iberty is . . . truly a creation of the
state . . . .” Id. at 88, quoted by RODGERS, supra note 86, at 159. A professor at
New York University urged that the individual:
may do things, ought to do things that will be for the benefit of the
community, but he has not the right to demand anything of the
community. Moreover, the criterion of what is for the benefit for the
community at large must be settled by the community itself, not by any
individual.
JEREMIAH W. JENKS, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICS FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE
AMERICAN CITIZEN 41 (Colum. Univ. Press, 1916) (1909); RODGERS, supra note 86,
at 159-60.
Burgess and some others thought that the liberty protected by the State would
expand with civilization, but the point is that liberty was the gift of the State. See
RODGERS, supra note 86, at 164.
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“original, absolute, unlimited, universal power over the
individual subject and over all associations of subjects.”218
Such views were commonplace. Professor James Garner of
Illinois declared that sovereignty “can be bound only by its
own will, that is, it can only be self-limited,” and according to
Westel Willoughby of Johns Hopkins, the state is “not a
creature of law.”219
Following this Germanic vision of the state, leading
scholars taught that individual rights restrained government
only as the State determined expedient. Wilson thought that
the “inviolability of person[s],” as protected by a bill of rights,
did “not prevent the use of force by administrative agents for
the accomplishment of . . . the legitimate objects of
government.”220 Instead, a bill of rights “simply prevents
malicious, unreasonable, arbitrary, unregulated direction of
force against individuals.”221 Frank Goodnow argued that an
individual’s rights were “conferred upon him . . . by the
society to which he belongs” and that what they were, could
therefore be “determined by the legislative authority in view
of the needs of that society. Social expediency, rather than
natural right, is thus to determine the sphere of individual
freedom of action.”222 In his anxiety about the anti-communal
character of “individual rights,” he expressed satisfaction
that “the sphere of governmental action is continually
widening and the actual content of individual rights is being
increasingly narrowed.”223
218. BURGESS, supra note 217, at 52.
219. JAMES WILFORD GARNER, INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE 251 (1910);
WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, AN EXAMINATION OF THE NATURE OF THE STATE
224 (1896).
220. Wilson’s Lectures on Administration at the John Hopkins (Jan. 26, 1981),
in 7 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 112, 154 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1969).
221. Id. (emphasis omitted).
222. GOODNOW, supra note 216, at 11.
223. Id. at 11, 21. Indeed, he regretted that “the private individual rights of
American citizens have come to be formulated and defined, not by representative
legislative bodies, as is now the rule in Europe, but by courts . . . .” Id. at 13.
Herbert Croly observed, “Individual freedom is important, but more important
still is the freedom of a whole people to dispose of its own destiny.” HERBERT
CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE 178 (1914).
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The implication was that judges had to accept intrusions
on rights, at least where the intrusions seemed necessary.
For example, after progressive legislatures authorized
administrative power, Goodnow urged that judges should
recognize the “wide discretion” of legislative bodies in
constitutional interpretation, as this was essential for
“[a]ttempts so to change the structure of our political system
and so to modify the content of private rights as to bring them
into conformity with modern conditions.”224 Such attitudes
obviously remain influential. As put by a contemporary
commentator, Peter Strauss, “social changes brought about
by industrial and post-industrial economies” could not have
been anticipated by the Constitution, and “American judges
have responded to this challenge, on the whole, by
interpreting the Constitution in ways that confirm the
structural changes that have been made, and by
reinterpreting citizens’ rights in light of the changed
arrangements.”225
German ideas about State power over rights (including
ideas about the merely individual character of rights and
about how the State was the source of rights) thus paved the
way for the subordination of rights to power. Americans
tended to value individual liberty, and they therefore
typically held back from the most extreme of German ideas,

Westel Willoughby generalized in 1910 about “Administrative Necessity as a
Source of Federal Power,” and under this heading he explained that “the principle
of administrative efficiency has been employed to permit the field of individual
rights to be entered.” WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, 1 THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 62 (1910). In other words, the Supreme Court:
has frankly argued that where, for the efficient performance of the
administrative duties laid upon the General Government, it is necessary
that an administrative order should take the place of a judicial process,
the private rights of person and property are not to be allowed to stand
in the way.
Id.
224. FRANK J. GOODNOW, SOCIAL REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 5 (New York,
Burt Franklin 1970) (1911); see KEN I. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES:
DISCONTINUITIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 112-17
(2004).
225. PETER L. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
(2d ed. 2002).
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but many embraced a Germanic view of the State’s power
over rights.
❧
When judges and commentators conclude that
enumerated constitutional rights must give way to power,
they no longer recall the origins of what they are saying. It
should not be assumed, however, that their ideas—whether
about necessitous or compelling government interests, about
public rights, or about the power of the State over rights—
arose out of thin air. Such ideas came from the absolutist
tradition that developed in the civil law and eventually
flourished in German Staatstheorie.
By recognizing this, one can begin to understand what is
at stake. The danger is not merely to one right or another,
but to all enumerated constitutional rights. And as a result,
the danger is not merely to rights, but to the constitutional
enterprise of subjecting government to law.

